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The consequences of tropical forest degradation and deforestation have gained global political 
attention due to their contribution on climate change and biodiversity loss. Forest degradation and 
deforestation are also having impacts on local peoples living in the forests. Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) and European Union Action Plan on Forest 
Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) including its Voluntary Partnership 
Agreements (VPAs) are two prominent efforts towards reducing the loss of tropical forests. Even 
though they have different implementation strategies, they both reach for positive change in 
governance. They are facing similar challenges including corruption, legality of land allocation 
and lack of secure tenure. Noticeably secure tenure is associated with most of the governance 
challenges. Several forest rich tropical countries such as Cameroon are participating in these 
processes to sustainably manage their forests. In Cameroon the rapid population growth together 
with growing global need for natural resources are driving unsustainable and illegal actions in 
forest sector. This master’s thesis examines how are REDD+ and FLEGT are contributing on 
forest governance and securing tenure rights of local peoples, how secure tenure can affect the 
implementation of the REDD+ and FLEGT processes and in what extent should the tenure rights 
be transferred to locals to achieve the goals of the REDD+ and FLEGT.  The empirical research 
is conducted through analysing policy documents and literature as well as interviewing officials 
and local peoples in Cameroon. The main results are that in Cameroon there are no real political 
will to address the forest loss, and the local peoples have very little role on protecting their 
livelihood even though it would be important for them and also for the processes of REDD+ and 
FLEGT. Also, the government of Cameroon gives a little role for REDD+ and FLEGT in the 
governance of forest resources. So far, the processes have not had significant influence on tenure 
condition in Cameroon. The recommendations of this study is for REDD+ and FLEGT to 
 concentrate more on education especially in local level since the lack of understanding is 
hindering the development of both processes. The collaboration and greater transparency between 
REDD+ and FLEGT would be crucial for their success.  
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1. Introduction  
During the past two decades, deforestation and forest degradation have gained global 
political attention mainly due to their contribution to global warming and loss of 
biodiversity (Kanninen et al., 2007; Douglas and Simula, 2011; Convention on 
Biological Diversity, 2009). Tropical deforestation and forest degradation contribute 
12% of the total annual global carbon emissions (Achard et al., 2014), and in many 
developing countries, is the main source of emissions (Karousakis, 2006). Tropical 
deforestation is also a major cause of biodiversity loss (Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 2009; Millenium Ecosystem Assessment 2005) and has significant impact 
on the local peoples who are highly dependent on their forested livelihoods (Tegegne 
et al., 2016; Christian and Faure, 2014). As a result, the efforts aimed at the sustainable 
management of forest and climate change mitigation are largely focused on controlling 
the tropical deforestation and forest degradation.  
 
 
Two of the most recent efforts towards reducing the loss of tropical forest include the 
European Union’s (EU) Action Plan on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and 
Trade (FLEGT) and its instrument Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) and 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+).  The 
FLEGT Action Plan – which was adopted by the EU in 2003 – sets out a program of 
actions that forms the EU’s response to the global problem of illegal logging and trade 
in associated timber. The cornerstones of the Action Plan are bilateral VPAs between 
EU and timber producing countries (European Commission, 2007). On the other hand, 
in 2005 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
launched REDD+. It is a mechanism for reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation but also addresses the importance of conserving and enhancing 
forest carbon stocks and managing them sustainably. There are two main multilateral 
REDD+ initiatives: United Nations Collaborative Program on Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN REDD) and 
the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) by World Bank. 
 
The EU FLEGT and the REDD+ are two distinct policy initiatives, operating under 
different design and implementation strategies. However, both reach for a positive 
 2 
change in governance (Angelsen et al. 2008; European Commission, 2003), and both 
face similar challenges in implementation (Owusu et al. 2010; Ramcilovic-Suominen 
and Saastamoinen 2010; Bolin et al. 2012). The range of challenges both processes are 
facing include corruption, legality of land allocation, lack of secure tenure and 
overlapping land titles (Owusu et al. 2010; Ramcilovic-Suominen and Saastamoinen, 
2010; Bolin et al. 2012). Noticeably secure tenure is multi-dimensional problem that 
is associated with most of the governance challenges (Njoh, 2013). 
 
Several forest-rich countries, such as Cameroon, are participating in FLEGT and 
REDD+ processes to sustainably manage their forests.  In Cameroon, rapid population 
growth together with increasing global need for natural resources is driving 
unsustainable and illegal actions in forest sector. Absence of clear tenure and access 
rights are encouraging people to clear new forested areas for logging but also for 
agriculture (Awono et al., 2014; Tegegne et al., 2016). Also weak alignment of 
institutional boundaries is making the land use planning more challenging. Currently, 
the forest and the tenure laws are under revision to clarify these issues.  
 
1.1. Previous Research  
Existing studies (e.g.  Geist and Lambin, 2002; Tegegne et al., 2016; Awono et al., 
2014) show that clear tenure rights have important role in reducing pressure from 
natural forests and preventing illegalities. It is perceived as highly important factor 
reducing deforestation (Tegegne et al., 2016) and incentivizing local people to protect 
the forests and increasing carbon storage (Bucki, 2014; Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009). 
Clear tenure is also vital for REDD+ and FLEGT to make sure the right actors are 
gaining the possible benefits when implementing the activities of REDD+ and FLEGT 
(Larson et al., 2013).  
 
Local participation in decision making processes is seen as a crucial factor ensuring 
sustainability and continuity in securing tenure rights (Carodenuto et al., 2014; 
Ostrom, 1990) and to increase transparency especially in countries with corrupted 
governance (Chhatre et al., 2012).  The uncertainties with securing tenure and local 
 3 
participation are prominent in many developing countries (Sunderlin et al., 2014) and 
are both parts of the social safeguards of REDD+ recognized in 16th United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties 
(COP16) in Cancun 2010. The social safeguards were created to reduce the possible 
adverse effects of REDD+ and to make sure the REDD+ projects are sustainable, long-
lasting and the local habitants are respected (Chhatre et al., 2012).  In Cameroon, both 
FLEGT and REDD+ processes are recent, and both aim to secure tenure especially in 
local level and increase participation in all levels of governance (Tegegne et al., 2016; 
Awono et al., 2014; R-PP Cameroon, 2013).  
 
1.2. Research Questions  
With the aim of pinpointing the contribution of tenure on deforestation and related 
issues from the perspective of REDD+ and FLEGT, this study – taking Cameroon as 
case study – has the main research question of finding out How REDD+ and FLEGT 
VPA have addressed and regarded the issues of land tenure and what challenges have 
arisen? To refine the question some additional questions are brought up: How to 
secure full and effective engagement and participation of national stakeholders on 
tenure and access rights? How could the coordination between FLEGT and REDD+ 
be strengthened? In what extent should the tenure rights be transferred to locals?  
 
The research questions are answered based on the data gathered from literature, policy 
documents and interviews with officials and local peoples in Cameroon.    
 
1.3. Structure of the Thesis 
After the introduction this thesis is structured as following: The section two presents 
the country profile of Cameroon, and section three introduces FLEGT and REDD+ at 
international and national level. Section four outlines the theoretical framework, and 
materials and methods are introduced in section five. Section six presents the results 
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of the study, and section seven discusses key findings of the study. Finally, section 
eight gives concluding remarks and makes recommendations.  
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2. Country Profile of Cameroon 
 
This chapter introduces Cameroon, first presenting its geographical, ecological and 
historical context as well as the political ground of the country. Also the state of the 
forest and the local tenure are introduced.  
 
2.3. Geographical, Ecological and Historical Context  
Cameroon is located in Central Africa in the coast of the Atlantic Ocean. Neighboring 
countries are Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria and 
Republic of Congo. Cameroon’s total land area is 475,442 km2   and total population 
was 22,7 million in 2014. (World Bank, 2014).  Population growth rate was 2,59% in 
2015 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015). Cameroon’s capital is Yaoundé, which is 
the second largest city after Douala. The proportion of urban population of the total 
population was 54, 4% and growing by 3.6 % annually between the years 2010 and 
2015 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015). 
 
Official languages are French and English though in Cameroon there are more than 
200 ethnolinguistic groups and more than 20 ethnic groups including the indigenous 
Pygmy people (Topa, 2009).  
 
Nominal GDP was 1488$ per capita in 2015 (International Monetary Fund, 2015) and 
HDI 0,512 (United Nations Development Programme, 2016). Services form 47,9% 
from GDP, agriculture 22,3% and industry 29,9% (Central Intelligence Agency, 
2015).  Forest sector’s share was 6% from the GDP in 2010 (de Wasseige, 2012). From 
the year 1980 timber has been the second largest export product in Cameroon 
constituting approximately 25% of the total foreign exchange (Topa, 2009). Non-
timber forest products (NTFPs) constitute an important share in domestic and foreign 




Figure 1. Cameroon's land cover. World Resource Institute (2007) 
 
Cameroon’s terrain and climate varies in different parts of the country. There is 
variation of different landscapes including coast, rainforest, mountains, desert and 
savanna. Twenty percent of the land is used by agriculture and 42% of the area is 
forested. Natural resources include petroleum, bauxite, iron, timber and hydropower. 
Main exported products are crude oil and petroleum products, lumber, cocoa beans, 
aluminum, coffee and cotton.  (Central intelligence agency, 2015) The Figure 1 shows 
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that the main forest cover of Cameroon is situated in the southern and the southwestern 
parts of the country.  
 
Cameroon’s forests are part of the Congo Basin, the second largest area of tropical 
forests in the world. The Cameroon forests are very endemic, and include rare and 
endangered species such as Cross-River Gorilla, African Elephant and African 
Western Bongo (Megevand, 2013). The estimated gross rate of deforestation and forest 
degradation in Cameroon between the years 2000-2010 was annually between 0.03% 
and 0.08% (De Wasseige et al., 2012). After the 1986 economic crisis the deforestation 
rate increased because of increased amount of farms in rural areas that started to 
produce land-consumptive food crops and clear forested land (Sunderlin et al., 2009). 
 
Despite the seemingly low rate of deforestation and forest degradation, the threat 
facing forests of Cameroon have dire consequences because of their role as a carbon 
sink, biodiversity hotspot and also their importance for local populations who are 
highly dependent on their forested livelihoods.  The deforestation and forest 
degradation rate is estimated to increase in near future because of growing population, 
demand for natural resources and agricultural commodities (Tegegne and Lindner, 
2014). 
 
2.2. Political and Economic Context 
Government regime in Cameroon is republic and multiparty. President is the chief of 
the state and is elected by voting for a seven year periods. Cameroon became 
independent in 1960 after being under colonial rule 76 years. First under the rule of 
Germany (1884-1919) and then, after the World War I, was divided between France 
and Britain until independence (Njoh, 2013). In Cameroon there exists mixed legal 
system of English common law, French civil law and customary law. Cameroon is 
highly corrupted country having the score of 27 (Transparency International, 2015), 
and it is negatively affecting the utilization and management of natural resources 
(Alemagi and Kozak, 2010). 
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Colonialism changed the land ownership structures. Germans allocated the land so that 
each family got their own parcels of land and all vacant areas belonged to Germany. 
After the World War I, French and British tried to transform as much land under their 
ownership as possible. For example, French decreed that all land that had been 
unoccupied 10 years is owned by the government (Njoh, 2013).  
 
The colonial rule influenced the land laws, and in contemporary Cameroon there are 
two independent laws: statutory law and customary law. This has been causing 
conflicts especially in issues related to tenure rights (Njoh, 2013). The local customary 
law for example has the first occupant’s right that gives the management rights to a 
person who first clears the land (Dkamela, 2011). The customary rights are exercised 
by villages and families and in many cases are inherited (Dkamela, 
2011).  Customarily owned land belongs officially to the government unless the local 
owner attains titling through complex legal procedures. Corrupted government 
officials are driving their self-interest and making titling almost impossible (Njoh, 
2013). Most of the Cameroon’s land belongs to government but some rights such as 
allowances of non-timber forest product (NTFP) collection are provided for local 
populations through Forest Act 1994 (Cotula and Mayers, 2009). The Ministry of 
Forests and Wildlife (MINFOF) is in charge of the forest related licenses and grants.  
 
The Land Act 1974 was to nationalize the land areas but no real change has happened: 
the customary land tenure coexists with the statutory without legal recognition 
(Sheleff, 2013). The Land Act 1974 reduced the rights of local populations, especially 
the rights of indigenous people (Sheleff, 2013) and in 1994 the new Forest Law aimed 
at restoring some of the rights that colonial and postcolonial rules had narrowed (Topa, 
2009).  Still especially the rights of communities remain weak, uneven and imperfect, 
but are better than in many other African countries (Topa, 2009). 
 
The forest law from the year 1994 gives communities the right to manage some forest 
areas without ownership (de Wasseige et al, 2012). The Ministry of Forest and Wildlife 
(MINFOF) can give renewable licenses of 25 years for communities of maximum 5000 
ha of forested land. The law also provides 10% royalties from logging profits for 
communities living near the concession area (Alemagi and Kozak, 2010). The rights 
of the communities are still very weak, and the process of registering the management 
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rights under communities has been very costly and difficult (de Wasseige et al., 2012). 
The customary rights are giving production rights to the local communities to make 
living from their forest related activities, but since the customary owned land in most 
cases belongs to the government, their livelihoods are insecure (Dkamela, 2011).  
 
2.4. Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Cameroon 
There are numerous different reasons for deforestation and forest degradation in 
Cameroon. The main direct causes of deforestation and forest degradation in 
Cameroon include agricultural expansion and wood extraction including formal and 
informal logging (Tegegne et al., 2016; Epule et al., 2014; Dkamela, 2011; de 
Wasseige et al., 2012; Megevand, 2013). The areas that have the densest population 
have also the highest deforestation rate (Epule et al., 2014). As it can be noticed from 
Fig 1, the forests are mainly concentrated on the South and South-West of Cameroon.  
 
2.3.1. Causes and Rates of Deforestation and Forest Degradation in 
Cameroon 
In Cameroon and elsewhere in Africa, conversion of forested land into agricultural use 
is growing because of increasing demographic density and increase in resource 
demand (Tegegne et al., 2016). Rural cultivation is characterized by ineffective use of 
surface area, low production rates and unsustainable slash and burn technique that 
degrades fertile land (Dkamela, 2010; Tegegne et al., 2014). 
Illegal small scale logging has major role as a cause of forest degradation, and is driven 
by the urgent need of resources of the local populations. The remote conditions and 
weak possibilities of distributing more sustainable energy options keep approximately 
80% of total population dependent on firewood and charcoal as their primary source 
of energy. Less than 40% of total population of Cameroon has access to electricity 
(Tegegne et al., 2016). Fuel wood and charcoal have the largest share in local forest 
product markets, especially in areas with growing urbanization rate (Dkamela, 
2010).  Growing population and growing need of energy encourages illegal harvesting 
and clearing new land. (Tegegne et al., 2016) Commercial logging by large companies 
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is mainly contributing to forest degradation because of the market driven need for 
selective logging of certain valuable tree species (Tegegne et al., 2016).   
 
The future potential of Cameroon for producing industrial crops such as palm oil, 
cocoa, rubber, tea and banana is a threat to forests (Dkamela, 2011; Tegegne et al., 
2016).  Also expansion of mining activities and mining related infrastructure will pose 
pressure on forested areas (de Wasseige et al., 2012; Tegegne et al., 2016). Especially 
the weak alignment of institutional boundaries and government’s inability to proper 
management and monitoring of forests are driving illegal and unsustainable actions. 
For example, mining or logging permits can be claimed on protected forest areas 
(Tegegne et al., 2016). 
 
The weak forest governance along with economic and demographic factors are the 
underlying drivers of deforestation; corruption, unfair allocation of logging permits, 
insufficient institutional capacity as well lack of human and financial resources are 
hindering sustainable forest management (Tegegne et al., 2016; Dkamela, 2011). 
 
2.4. Policies and Efforts to Curb Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation in Cameroon 
Illegal logging and unsustainable natural resource management are prominent threat 
to Cameroon’s forests (Alemagi and and Kozak, 2010). Overlapping land titles and 
high level of corruption and the development ‘vision 2035’ of the country are making 
it challenging to promote sustainable forest activities.  
 
In Cameroon there are many different environmental non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and also the two major international instruments, FLEGT and REDD+ are 
involved in Cameroon’s efforts to curb deforestation and forest degradation. 
Cameroon is very dependent on foreign aid in its environmental policies since the 
foreign aid consists 75% of the government’s budget (Epule et al., 2014). The policies 
and efforts to curb deforestation and forest degradation in Cameroon are introduced in 
Table 1 (Dkamela, 2010; Duveiller et al., 2008; Epule et al., 2014). 
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Table 1. Policies and efforts to curb deforestation and forest degradation in Cameroon (Dkamela, 2010; 
Duveiller et al., 2008; Epule et al., 2014) 
 
 
Especially REDD+ and FLEGT have addressed the importance of involving also local 
people in decision making, and when developing these mechanisms, there have been 
different workshops and other sessions arranged by environmental NGOs (Somorin et 
al., 2014; Epule et al, 2014; Dkamela, 2010). However, the local participation in these 
processes has been only minor, and it has not happened in the scale that was planned 
(Epule et al., 2014). Despite of the weak representation of local populations in decision 
making and planning processes, the NGOs have had a clear role in constituting the 
FLEGT and REDD+ in Cameroon (Somorin et al., 2014).     
Year Action
1992 New forest policy, creation of ministry of environment and forestry (MINEF)
1994 New forest law that defines the rights of local communities
1996 Framework law on environmental management, emphasis on sustainable 
exploitation
2002 Establishment of The Congo basin forest partnership (CBFB) that brings 
together dozens of different governmental and non-governmental 
environmental actors
2004 The forest and environment sector programme (FESP),
2005 Cameroon signed the Treaty of the conservation and sustainable management 
of forest ecosystems and established the Central Africa Forest Commission 
(COMIFAC)
-FLEGT and REDD+ negotiations started
2011 Signing of FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreement
2013 Validation of REDD+ Readiness Preparation Proposal
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3. REDD+ and FLEGT 
 
This section introduces REDD+ and FLEGT at global level and national level, briefing 
the context in Cameroon.  
 
3.1. REDD+ Globally  
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) was first 
launched at 2005 at United Nations framework convention on climate change 
(UNFCCC). In 2007 Bali Action Plan addressed the need to focus also on 
conservation, sustainable forest management and enhancement of forest carbon stocks 
in developing countries. In 2010 Cancun agreement included these as a ‘+’ to REDD. 
(Angelsen et al., 2012)  
 
REDD+ is a climate change mitigation mechanism that includes two main initiatives: 
UN-REDD and FCPF of the World Bank. In Cameroon the FCPF has bigger role than 
the initiatives of UN-REDD. The different actions of REDD+ include institutional 
reforms of governance, tenure, decentralization and community forest management. 
Also addressed are reduced impact logging and establishment of new protected areas. 
The idea is to change the incentives of people for conserving forests, and payments for 
ecosystem services (PES) are conditional on the outcomes of protection of carbon 
stocks and emission reductions (Angelsen et al., 2008). To make sure the REDD+ does 
not have any adverse effects on social or environmental sustainability, social 
safeguards were created in Cancun Agreement 2010 (UN-REDD, 2013).  These 
safeguards are assuring that REDD+ , among others, respects the rights of local people, 
protects biodiversity as well as ensures transparency (Peskett and Todd, 2013).  
 
The REDD+ processes is composed of three phases.  In the first phase the REDD+ 
strategy is developed with the help of donors. In the second phase REDD+ strategy is 
implemented with the help of donors and in third phase the implementation of REDD+ 
strategy is continued and payments are conducted for verified emission reductions 





Figure 2. Three phases of national REDD+ strategy. (Modified from UN-REDD, 2013). 
 
The different funders of REDD+ include public, private, national and international 
actors. Different payment methods include taxes, carbon markets and auctioning of 
allowances (Angelsen et al., 2012). The funds are targeted for example on capacity 
building and to address the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (Angelsen 
et al., 2008). 
 
3.1.1. REDD+ Process in Cameroon 
The rate of deforestation and forest degradation is distressing and the deforestation in 
Cameroon is expanding due to population growth and global growing demand for 
agricultural products. Sustainable forest management (SFM) has been already many 
years the aim of Cameroon’s government not only to reduce DD but also to maximize 
social and economic benefits (Somorin et al., 2014). Because of these issues, 
Cameroon has been engaged to REDD+ since 2005. The first substantial outcome 
came in 2013 when Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) was validated (Alemagi et 
al., 2014). 
 
In 2008 the REDD+ finalized its readiness plan idea notes (R-PIN) and launched its 




Figure 3. The Readiness process in Cameroon. (Modified from Figure 1.  In Alemagi et al., 2014). 
 
Drafting of R-PP involved many different stakeholders for instance the civil society, 
the media, the research institutions, the private sector, local populations and 
governmental actors. The preparation of the R-PP started in 2011 and it was finally 
validated in 2013.  The draft was developed with the support of the government, civil 
society, FCPF and other non-governmental international organizations. UN-REDD 
was also a major contributor. 
 
According to Mbatu (2015) the key strategies of Cameroon’s REDD+ are to develop 
the rural populations development through poverty alleviation, payments for 
ecosystem services (PES), decentralize decision making and also to increase forest 
monitoring, improve governance and increase capacity building. The REDD+ 
strategies support Cameroon’s long-term development goals called VISION 2035 
(Mbatu, 2015).  
 
The Ministry of Environment, Nature Protection and Sustainable Development 
(MINEPDED) is in charge of Cameroon’s climate change related policies and is also 
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in charge of all REDD+ activities in the country. The national REDD+ Steering 
committee and the national observatory on Climate Change are both housed by 
MINEPDED (Mbatu, 2015). 
 
The Ministry of Forests and Wildlife (MINFOF) coordinates projects related to 
forestry, particularly afforestation and reforestation projects. Other ministries that are 
involved in the REDD+ include Ministry of Finance (MINFI), Ministry of Livestock, 
Fishery and Animal Industry (MINEPIA), Ministry of Social Affairs (MINAS), 
Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MINATD), Ministry of 
agriculture and rural development (MINADER) and Ministry of Water Resources and 
Energy (MINEE) (Alemagi and Kozak., 2010). 
 
Together with governmental actors the stakeholders also include civil society such as 
different NGOs, development partners such as World Bank, private sector and the 
media. The role of NGOs was to communicate with local populations to gather 
information from local level and also to share information at a national level. The 
NGOs also host facilitation meetings with different stakeholders and engage them in 
designing REDD+ policies (Somorin et al., 2014). In R-PIN very few NGOs were 
consulted, but in R-PP the NGOs got a bigger role. The private companies, such as 
agriculture and timber industries are not given a big role in decision making when 















Table 2. Different actors in REDD+ in Cameroon (Modified from Alemagi et al., 2014). 
 
 
MINEPDED has established the institutional management structure of REDD+ that 
includes steering committee and Technical Secretariat (R-PP, Cameroon, 2013, The 
REDD+ desk, 2015). The Steering Committee is responsible for making policy and 
strategy proposals and to validate REDD+ processes. The Steering Committee 
includes different stakeholders such as government services, civil society, indigenous 
people and private sector (R-PP Cameroon, 2013).  The Technical Secretariat is the 
operational body of REDD+ and is responsible for all the practicalities and also 
coordinates and monitors the implementation of REDD+ projects and initiatives. 
Technical Secretariat also makes sure that all stakeholders including local traditional 
rulers, indigenous communities, civil society, forest industry and municipal and 




MINEPDED In charge of REDD+ activities in Cameroon
MINFOF Responsible for forestry related REDD+ activities
MINFI Receives and disburses REDD+ funds for REDD+ projects
MINEPIA Responsible for reducing deforestation from livestock
MINAS Ensures the equitable benefit sharing from exploitation of natural resources
MINATD Responsible for the local management of REDD+ projects
MINEE In charge of all bioenergy and other energy sector related policies
MINADER Cooperation with MINFOF to reduce deforestation
IRAD Research in agricultural sector for reducing deforestation
Civil society Ensures consultation and participation of local people in REDD+ process
Research institutions Capacity building through the demonstration of pilot projects
Development partners Provide funding for REDD+ pilot projects
Private sector Conducts feasibility studies for future investments in REDD+
The media Shares information and discusses about REDD+ mechanism
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To help coordination and cooperation between different ministries, donors and NGOs 
in Cameroon the mechanism called Consultation Circle of Partners of MINEPDED 
and MINFOF (CCPM) was created. It sets operational rules, guidelines and practices 
to achieve sustainable forest management and coordinates REDD+ processes 
(Somorin et al., 2014). 
 
In Cameroon there has already been a number of different piloting projects and 
initiatives. The first project was funded by German remote-sensing company GAF AG 
in 2007. The aim of the pilot project was to monitor the forest biomass and estimate 

























Table 3. REDD+ Pilot Projects and Initiatives in Cameroon (Modified from Alemagi et al, 2014). 
 
Cameroon is now in its preparation phase of REDD+ developing its strategies and 
building the capacity by increasing information among stakeholders (the REDD+ desk, 
2015). The framework for REDD+ implementation is in process and free, prior and 
informed consent (FPIC) mechanism has been integrated into use. FPIC promotes fair 
treatment of rural forest people, and makes sure there are no coercion or manipulation 
and that all the information needed is provided for communities (Mahanty and 
McDermott, 2013). Also the drivers of deforestation are identified and the national 
system of measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) has had significant progress 
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(FCPF, 2015).  Still many factors need improvements. The consultation and 
participation of all stakeholders, especially the involvement of local populations need 
to be developed, as well as assessments of social and environmental impacts of 
REDD+ and the design of efficient benefit sharing system (FCPF, 2015; Alemagi et 
al., 2014).  
 
3.2. FLEGT Globally 
The FLEGT was published in May 2003 by European Commission. It is EU’s reaction 
to tackle illegal logging and the trade of illegally sourced timber products. The FLEGT 
Action Plan targets seven different areas (European Commission, 2007): 
1. Support to timber producing countries 
2. Activities to promote trade in legal timber 
3. Promoting public procurement policies 
4. Support for private sector initiatives 
5. Safeguards for financing and investment 
6. Use of existing legislative instruments or adoption of new legislation to support 
the plan 
7. Addressing the problem of conflict timber 
 
Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) are important components of the FLEGT 
Action Plan. They are bilateral binding agreements between the EU and a timber 
producing country that enable cooperation to improve forest governance and 
regulations related to illegal logging (EU FLEGT facility, 2014). 
 
VPA ensures that the forest law is consistent and promotes sustainable forest 
management. It also aims to improve transparency and accountability. One important 
factor of VPA is to ensure the wellbeing of local communities and to link poverty 
reduction strategies on VPA to achieve the targets of FLEGT (European Commission, 
2007). VPA also includes capacity building activities to support regulatory reform in 




To ensure only legal timber is exported to the EU, each timber producing country 
designs its own legality assurance system (LAS). LAS defines legal timber, controls 
the timber supply chain, verifies compliance and monitors implementation of actions 
(EU FLEGT facility, 2014). European Timber regulation (EU TR) is another 
component of FLEGT Action Plan. The EU TR was enforced in 2013 to prohibit all 
illegal timber and timber products from entering into EU markets (EU FLEGT facility, 
2014). The EU TR requires EU operators to practice due diligence and keeping records 
so that the origin of every timber unit can be clarified (EU FLEGT Facility, 2014). 
 
3.2.1. The VPA Process in Cameroon 
Cameroon is Africa’s largest exporter of tropical hardwood to EU (EU, 2013) and one 
of the biggest factors affecting Cameroon’s forest are the illegal logging activities 
(Tegegne et al., 2016). Substantial share of the Cameroon’s timber is exported to 
European markets, and to ensure the sustainability and legality of the timber EU and 
Cameroon started their negotiations in 2005 (Serge et al., 2013). The amount of timber 
exported to the EU has been declining by -10,9% between the years 2004-2013, but 
Cameroon is still one of the biggest exporters of tropical timber to the EU (ITTO, 
2016). The informal pre-negotiations were during the years 2005-2006 assessing the 
VPA’s ability to increase timber product exports from Cameroon to EU and to help 
reinforcing already ongoing governance reforms (Serge et al, 2013). More formal 
negotiations started in 2007 with first national multi-stakeholder negotiations and then 
bilateral negotiations with EU, and continued until 2009. The signing of FLEGT VPA 
was done in May 2010 and ratification in 2011. Cameroon is now on its 
implementation phase of VPA and reforming regulatory frameworks, developing 
methodology for VPA impact monitoring and LAS system to get the FLEGT licensing 
and building capacity. Figure 4 presents the timeline of the negotiations of Cameroon’s 




Figure 4.  Timeline of Cameroon’s FLEGT VPA negotiations (EU FLEGT Facility, 2014) 
 
The aim of Cameroon’s VPA is to ensure that all timber is legally sourced, transported 
and exported and to promote sustainable forest management that supports the 
livelihoods of local populations (Serge et al., 2013).  The VPA process in Cameroon 
focuses on strengthening forest governance, promoting Cameroon’s timber products, 
improving Cameroon’s competitiveness in the international markets, encouraging 
investments in sustainable forest management and strengthening the capacity of forest 
stakeholders (EU FLEGT facility, 2014). 
 
The Ministry of Forest and Wildlife (MINFOF) is in charge of negotiating and 
implementing the FLEGT VPA process in Cameroon. The role of civil society and 
especially the role of local NGOs has been significant in negotiation processes. The 
local NGOs have been consulting local populations, but the direct involvement of 
locals has not been strong (Serge et al, 2013). The private sector, both big and small 
companies, has been involved through consultative meetings arranged by IUCN (Serge 
et al., 2013). IUCN’s role is to be a facilitator in multi-stakeholder dialogue 
(Ngendakumana et al, 2014). Other major NGOs that were involved include German 
Corporation for International Cooperation (GTZ) and the Forests and the European 
Union Resource Network (FERN) (Ngendakumana et al, 2014). Other representatives 
in the negotiation committees include: Prime Minister’s office, the Presidency, 
Ministry of External Relations, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Economy and Ministry 
of Finance. The role of the negotiation committee was to “develop negotiating and 
draft VPA annexes in consultation with stakeholders” (EU FLEGT facility, 2014) and 
to facilitate the negotiations between EU and Cameroon. 
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The Joint Implementation Committee is supervising the implementation process in 
Cameroon. The Committee has two structures; Joint Implementation Council and Joint 
Monitoring Committee. The Council has a representative from MINFOF and from EU 
and the role is to decide about the correct implementation of the VPA in Cameroon 
(VPA Cameroon, 2012; Serge et al., 2013). The consultative structure is Joint 
Monitoring Committee that is in charge of monitoring and evaluating the 
implementation of VPA as well as facilitating the communication and information 
sharing between the different stakeholders (VPA Cameroon, 2012) National 
monitoring committee focuses on the implementation of the VPA on the national level 
in Cameroon and consists of representatives from the different stakeholder groups (EU 
FLEGT facility, 2014).  
 
JMC has also set up a working group in April 2014 that aims to develop the VPA 
process and advance the VPA implementation. The working group includes 
stakeholders from the governmental level, EU delegation, civil society, employers 
from the forest sector and has technical advisors from GIZ and EU FLEGT facility 
(EU FLEGT, 2014). 
 
Independent monitoring is a part of the LAS and it collects information from all 
stakeholders to gather evidence from illegal activities in the field level (Serge et al., 
2013). Independent auditor will complement the work of independent monitoring and 
assess the performance of the FLEGT VPA in Cameroon (Serge et al, 2013) 
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 4. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
 
 
This chapter introduces the theoretical framework of the study. The framework helps 
to understand the importance of tenure security and local participation within the 
framework of FLEGT and REDD+.  The framework forms the basis that is used when 
analyzing the different policy documents and implications of appropriate tenure and 
land use rights. 
 
Sustainable forest management (SFM) reduces deforestation and forest degradation 
that are also the concerns of global well-being and targeted by international 
mechanisms such as FLEGT and REDD+.  Another aim of this chapter is to introduce 
the factors affecting SFM and rationalize how decentralization and local participation 
can help in configuration of SFM.  Especially secure tenure rights have been seen as 
primary condition for SFM (Siry et al., 2015) 
 
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 1 presents the concept of forest 
governance that will be used when discussing about the sustainable forest management 
issues in Cameroon. Section 2 conceptualizes tenure and different regimes of 
ownership are described in section 3. Section 4 introduces legal pluralism and its 
implications and in section 5 the term decentralization is opened up together with the 
concept of cross-border, multinational governance. In the section 6 the local 
sustainable management of forest resources is conceptualized through Elinor Ostrom’s 
principles of common-pool resource management and also the roles of deliberative 
democracy and participation are defined. 
 
4.1. Forest Governance: definitions and concepts 
Different scholars and organizations have given many definitions to governance. Kjaer 
(2004) comprehends governance as a socially construct institution that includes 
different rules, norms and codes of behavior and involves interaction between different 
actors that are linked with each other through different affairs to achieve solutions and 
opportunities. On the other hand, Bevir (2008) defines governance simply as “all 
patterns of rule”, and that governance is “all processes of governing, whether 
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undertaken by a government, market or network, whether over family, tribe, formal or 
informal organization or territory and whether through laws, norms, power or 
language” (Bevir, 2013).   
 
In the context of forest management, the concept of forest governance has been 
introduced by diverse sources (Mundial, 2009; Proforest, 2014; World resource 
institute, 2013; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Arts, 2014).  Forest governance refers to 
governing actions of the forest resources autonomously or in mutual interaction 
between government, markets, organizations and local level (Arts, 2014; Lemos and 
Agrawal, 2006). Different actors include stakeholders such as non-governmental 
organizations, government officials, local communities and international mechanisms 
such as FLEGT and REDD+ (Arts and Visseren-Hamakers, 2014; Lemos and 
Agrawal, 2006).  In many cases the problems arising from the absence of good 
governance are due to the lack of financial, information and human resources (Knight, 
2010). 
 
The indicators of good governance have been introduced by many (e.g., Mundial, 
2009; Dietz and Ostrom, 2003; Arts, 2014; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). The control 
of corruption, impartiality, political stability, rule of law, accountability and 
participation are characterized as the key indicators that are forming the basis of good 
and effective governance and as the most applicable features affecting tenure rights. 
World Bank (Mundial, 2009) defines five ‘building blocks’ that most constitute the 
concept of good forest governance.  
 Transparency, Accountability and Public Participation 
 Stability of forest institutions and conflict management 
 Quality of forest administration including the willingness to address forest 
sector issues, corruption control, capacity and effectiveness and forest 
monitoring and evaluation 
 Coherence of Forest Legislation and Rule of Law including the quality of law 
enforcement, adjudication and recognition, enforcement and respect of 
property rights 
 Economic Efficiency, Equity and Incentives including incentives for 
sustainable use, penalties for violations and equitable allocation of forest 
benefits. 
 25 
 (Mundial, 2009) 
 
In this thesis the concept ‘governance’ is understood as all actions of governing and 
all patterns of rule that are composed by different multi-level actors including 
government, local populations, international organizations and civil society. 
 
4.2. Tenure: definitions and concepts 
There exist many different definitions for the concept of tenure, for example FAO 
(2002) defines tenure as “who can use the resources of the land for how long and under 
what conditions” but also that it is a socially constructed institution which is created 
to regulate and control the behavior of people (FAO, 2002; Bromley, 1989). Tenure is 
not only ownership, but defines the rights of who are allowed to use the resource as 
well as how and when the use is allowed (FAO, 2002; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; 
Ostrom and Hess, 2007).   
 
Ostrom and Schlager (1996) identify five different factors that are defining the concept 
of tenure: access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation. Table 4 defines 
each of these factors.  
 
Table 4. Different factors of tenure. (Ostrom and Schlager, 1996) 
 
 
To have full ownership rights, one must obtain all of these five rights. Private forest 
ownership includes these all, and it can provide incentives for long term investments 
(Siry et al., 2015). However, in many cases alternative land uses are more profitable 
than forest conservation and private forest ownership regime is often associated with 
Access the right to entry in the defined area
Withdrawal the right to gather the resources
Management the right to decide the future and the structure of the area
Exclusion the right to decide who will have access rights
Alienation the right to sell or lease either the management or exclusion rights
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deforestation, forest degradation and forest fragmentation (Siry et al., 2015). 
According to Bromley (1989), private ownership can cause conflicts and create high 
transaction costs compared to common property regime. 
 
If a person has only the rights of access and withdrawal, he cannot construct own rules 
of managing the area. His rights are defined by those who have the rights of 
management and exclusion. If the local rural people have ownership of the forest 
resources, they will manage the area more sustainably (e.g. Chhatre and Agrawal, 
2009; Hayes and Persha, 2010).  Especially the rights of management and exclusion 
are experienced as necessary (Robinson et al., 2014) and they frame the possibilities 
what one can do to the resource legally. Without the rights of management and 
exclusion, the person has no incentives to sustainably use or conserve the area. There 
is no assurance that the area will be under his usage also in the future but to be 
conquered by other people (Ostrom and Schlager, 1996; Katila, 2008). In most 
countries in Africa, for example in Cameroon, the rights of management, exclusion 
and alienation, are at command of government officials because the land is mostly 
owned by government (Njoh, 2013). The local rural populations have only the first 
two of the rights, access and withdrawal. 
 
The rights of rural populations are not respected in most developing countries and they 
don’t have possibilities to strengthen their rights (Anseeuw et al., 2011; Katila, 2008). 
In Africa the property rights can be formal or informal and be constituted through 
different customs, laws, inheritances or religious reasons (Knight, 2010). 
In developing countries, the government ownership has been linked to corruption, lack 
of conservation and equaling open access property (Katila, 2008).  
Borras and Franco (2010) argue that in many cases in developing countries tenure 
rights are formed by government or non-government actors pursuing towards their 
own interests without respecting the tenure rights of rural people. For example, in 
Cameroon the government officials are driving their private gain and taking bribes 
which violates the control of corruption and impartiality (Njoh, 2013). This and also 
the ambiguous bureaucratic procedures are making it almost impossible for rural 
people to justify their land rights (Njoh, 2013). Because of the undesirable effects of 
governmental control of forests especially many developing countries are aiming to 
change their forest management from government to forest governance by including 
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different actors such as civil society and international communities (Arts, 2014; Lemos 
and Agrawal, 2006). 
 
Insecure tenure rights follow the absence of good forest governance (McCarthy and 
Tacconi, 2011) and are a major reason for deforestation and forest degradation in 
tropical countries (Geist and Lambin, 2002). Insecure tenure rights also make it more 
possible to dispossess local people from their land e.g. if REDD+ schemes increase 
the land and carbon values of forested areas (Cotula and Mayers, 2009). EU FLEGT 
Action Plan identifies secure tenure as important factor to ensure the achievements of 
its goals, especially the land rights of communities. If the land rights are not mapped 
and recognized, logging is illegal which reduces sustainable forest management 
(Dooley and Ozinga, 2011). 
 
Some scholars (e.g. Tacconi, 2007) argue that clear tenure rights are not a panacea to 
the sustainable use of resources. Local people might not understand the importance of 
conservation and the consequences of deforestation, and act in a way that is socially 
accepted in their community even though it might not be sustainable or socially 
acceptable in global level (Ostrom, 1990).  Without incentives to protect forests, 
agricultural income can be more attractive to local populations than forest conservation 
(Tacconi, 2007). They can also be easily manipulated to alienate their land for 
foreigners (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Without sustainable management of the resource 
it will deplete at an unsustainable rate because of overharvesting (Hardin, 1968; 
Ostrom, 1990; Arts, 2014) 
 
In this thesis tenure is understood as an institution that is partly defining the behavior 
of people using the resources. It has different levels of rights that determine that in 
what extent an individual can exploit the resources, and its different forms are 
introduced in Table 4.   
 
4.4. Legal Pluralism 
A substantial issue in Africa is legal pluralism: customary and statutory laws exist 
independently (Schlager and Ostrom, 1996). Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan (2002) define 
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legal pluralism as “coexistence and interaction of multiple legal orders within a social 
setting or domain of social life”. These different legal orders are not equal and usually 
state recognized orders are more powerful and used for example to claim land as state 
property against local customs (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002). 
 
Legal pluralism is common in many countries that have been suffering colonialism. 
Before colonial rule the African people had different cultural based systems to define 
their land rights (Knight, 2010). The colonizers enforced their own rules to suit their 
own purposes (Knight, 2010) and the local laws were ignored and colonizers imposed 
local people under their new legal orders (Rantala, 2013) without the approval of locals 
who were expected to follow the rules (Sheleff, 2013). After independency the local 
rules were returned but the colonizers’ statutory laws in many cases stayed prevalent 
even though the customary laws continued to be followed locally (Rantala, 2013). 
Before colonizers the African populations didn’t have clear property rights and the 
colonizers supposed all land to be free for taking and claimed vast land areas under the 
ownership of colonized government (Knight, 2010). Still in many countries in Africa 
government, instead of local populations, owns most of the land areas. 
 
Customary law is respected in local scale independently without government 
authorization (Anseeuw et al., 2011; Njoh, 2013) and statutory law provides the legal 
rights. These two rights are in most cases overlapping and causing tenure insecurity 
and land allocation issues. For example, the land that is used by locals and which by 
customary law belongs to them can legally, by statutory law, be sold or leased by 
governmental officials (Anseeuw et al, 2011). Local populations can be uninformed 
about the statutory law, and violate the national level rules. This unawareness is one 
of the major source of uncertainty and insecurity (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002) 
and for that reason local populations clear the land as to prove that it is occupied, which 
is the way of declaring customary land tenure in many developing countries (Sunderlin 
et al., 2009).  Many African countries don’t recognize customary tenure rights and lack 
capacity to define them even when the local populations occupy the land or have 
inherited it (Unruh, 2008).  The overlaps between statutory and customary law can 
lead to conflicts between government and the local users of the resource (Siry et al., 
2015).   Knight (2010) suggests that one should recognize these overlaps and start 
making customary rights equally powerful to statutory rights. 
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4.5. Decentralization 
Decentralization is a form of action that relocates the authorization rights from state 
control to local users or to lower level in administration (Larson and Soto, 2008), either 
local administration officers (Siry et al., 2015). If the authorization rights are relocated 
to communities or individuals Siry et al. (2015) name it as devolution. Here both of 
these actions are under the concept of decentralization. In many cases in forestry sector 
decentralization has been seen to reduce transaction costs, increase revenues and 
increase sustainable forest management practices (e.g. Larson and Soto, 2008) and 
make policy more democratic and effective (Ribot et al., 2006; Arts, 2014). When 
transferring decision making power from state to other stakeholders, government gets 
possibilities to resolve conflicts by those who are mostly affecting on them. 
Government will stay in strong lead but gives decision making possibilities to other 
stakeholders as well.  Arts (2014) adds that in most cases decentralization, especially 
over valuable resources, has only been symbolic gesture and no real transfers of rights 
have happened. The government does not want to leave management rights of valuable 
timber for local communities and limits the decision making rights of locals or gives 
the rights to locals who serve the government interest (Ribot et al., 2006).   
 
Many individuals, especially local indigenous people are not given legal rights and 
possibilities to take part in decision making and implementing policies even though it 
is seen important by many scholars (e.g. Ostrom, 1990; Hartz-Karp and Briand, 2009). 
Deliberative democracy is a form of action that encourages participation of local 
people in the political processes and evaluates their values and priorities to make their 
word count (Hartz-Karp and Briand, 2009). Deliberative democracy is helping 
communities to address their problems and governments to find ways solving them. 
Deliberative democracy increases equity, accountability, transparency and 
responsiveness and strengthens the mutual understanding between government and 
local populations (Hartz-Karp and Briand, 2009). 
 
Ostrom suggests that the local people may need some external assistance to make their 
word count (Ostrom, 1990). Siitonen and Hämäläinen (2004) are suggesting 
participatory methods as external assistance to create arena where all stakeholders can 
communicate. Participatory methods are different facilitation, learning and 
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involvement tools that achieve to find a common goal among different stakeholders. 
Participation has been seen to have great efficiency, good level of equity, low 
transaction costs and help in decentralizing natural resource decision making (Siitonen 
and Hämäläinen, 2004). Same kinds of ideas are expressed by Daniels and Walker 
(2001). They introduce collaborative learning as a purpose of public participation, and 
as a potential for mutual learning through involving all stakeholders. They promote 
collaborative learning in cases that are complex, but where improvement must be 
achieved. Using methods that include collaborative learning local people can get 
possibilities to make their words count in affairs concerning them. They tell that 
“collaborative learning has a role to play in incorporating the voices of all parties in 
both the local and national policy areas.” (Daniels and Walker, 2001) Also Woodhill 
and Van der Vugt (2011) present in their principles for multi-stakeholder processes the 
importance of effective communication between the different stakeholders.  
 
Participation is important both to FLEGT and REDD+ implementation and 
enforcement. It makes sure the plans target right problems (Colchester, 2006) and also 
builds trust among local level participants (Dooley and Ozinga, 2011).   
Tenure and local participation are addressed in both FLEGT and REDD+ as important 
factors affecting deforestation and forest degradation. This framework forms the basis 
to analyze which components are the most crucial ones to target and to see if they are 
targeted in FLEGT and REDD+ documents as well as in Cameroon’s legislations. 
 
Local effective and transparent management promotes REDD+ implementation and 
enforcement as well as sustainable forest management (Cotula and Mayers, 
2009).  Local people who have rights of management and exclusion have been 
managing forests more sustainably and valuing more conservation than when 
government has those rights. (Porter-Bolland et al., 2012; Chhatre and Agrawal 2009; 
Arts, 2014; Ostrom, 1990).  Also when comparing to many centrally authorized 
protected forest areas, locally managed forests have lower deforestation rates (Porter-
Bolland et al., 2012) because people have tenure security and then feel responsible 
over the resources (Arts, 2014; Ostrom, 1990).  Without sustainable management of 
the resource it will deplete at an unsustainable rate because of overharvesting (Hardin, 
1968; Arts, 2014). 
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4.5.1. Cross-border governance 
Until early 1980s governmental control in environmental issues was promoted 
internationally but then noticed ineffective because of insufficient resources for 
management (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). New global efforts are forming governance 
that exceeds the borders of government (Arts, 2014). These efforts are interventions 
targeting to influence on environmental issues and are seen gaining involvement of 
multiple actors as well as promoting social learning (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006).  For 
example, Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), certification systems and market 
directing tools are bringing the global sustainability objectives to local level (Arts, 
2014). The new actors in forest governance are non-governmental organizations, civil 
societies, international institutions and organizations as well as local people who are 
involved through participatory methods (Arts, 2014). 
 
4.6. Sustainable common-pool resource management 
Ostrom (1990) introduced eight principles that ensure sustainable management of a 
common pool resource (CPR) such as forest. These can be seen in Table 5 on the next 
page. Common-pool resource can be defined as a resource from where it is difficult to 
exclude users and where the increase in the number of users decreases the number of 
available resources (Steins and Edwards, 1999).  Common-pool resource can be 
owned by government and have a status of open access resource, or it can be owned 
or managed by a community (Ostrom, 1990). The positive utility gained from using 
the resource is always bigger than the negative utility since it is shared with all the 
people extracting the resource (Hardin, 1968). This will eventually result in over-
exploitation and degradation of the resource (Hardin, 1968). In this case, credible 
commitment fails and short-sighted profit-seeking occurs. If there are no clear rules on 
how to manage the resource sustainably, for the users it is same as permitting non-
sustainable usage (Ostrom, 1990). Clear and legitimate rules are important in defining 
who can use the resource and to have sanctions for breaking the rules (Ostrom, 1990; 
Siry et al., 2015). If the local populations have the possibility to participate in 
developing the rules and the rules are adapted to local context the rules are more 
enduring and people are more likely to follow them (Ostrom, 1990; Siry et al., 2015). 
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When comparing to government forest ownership regime, communally managed 
forests have lower deforestation and forest degradation rates ((Porter-Bolland et al., 
2012; Chhatre and Agrawal 2009) because people have tenure security and then feel 
responsible for the resources (Arts, 2014; Ostrom, 1990).   
 
 In the Ostrom’s principles (1990) the individuals who have rights to use the forest 
have legal status of doing so. This means that the rights are recognized also by statutory 
law in addition to customary law. There exists a clarified document in which the usage 
period and permitted amount of extraction are clearly defined. Every person knows his 
or hers share of the resource, and the permitted actions only include those that are 
useful for the people and do not harm the resource permanently. The people who have 
usage rights for the resource must take part in planning and decision making, and they 
must inform others about the condition of the resource. All the people know about 
sanctions that follow when conducting wrong or harmful actions. The people using the 
resource have an effective conflict-solving mechanism, and a possibility to organize 
their management and governance over the resource without accountancy to external 



















Table 5. Design principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR institutions. (Ostrom, 1990) 
 
  
1. Clearly defined boundaries Individuals/households who have rights to withdraw resource 
units must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR.
2. Congruence between 
appropriation and provision rules 
and local conditions
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology and/or 
quantity of resources units are related to local conditions and 
provision rules requiring labor, material and/or money.
3. Collective choice arrangements Those affected by operational rules can participate in modifying 
them.
4. Monitoring Active auditing of CPR conditions by monitors accountable to 
appropriators or are appropriators.
5. Graduated sanctions Dependent on the seriousness and context set by officials 
accountable to appropriators or are the appropriators.
6. Conflict resolution mechanisms Rapid access to low cost local arenas to resolve conflicts.
7. Minimal recognition of rights to 
organize
Rights to organize institutions are not challenged by external 
government authorities.
8. Nested enterprises Only for CPRs that are part of larger systems. Appropriation, 
provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution and 






This section presents the materials and methods used in the study as well as the 
approach chosen and the limitations of this study.   
 
5.1. Study Area 
The questionnaire survey was conducted in six villages in Southeast Cameroon. The 
villages were part of two different Payment for Ecosystem services (PES) projects, the 
other conducted by World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and the other by Centre for 
Environment and Development (CED).  
 
Figure 5. Locations of the sites (Google, 2016). 
 
In the Figure 5 is presented the locations of the sites. The blue star on the left marks 
the approximate location of the CED site Nkolenyeng, and the yellow star on the right 
marks the approximate locations of the WWF sites. The other CED site Nomedjoh is 
situated near the WWF sites.  
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 In WWF sites four villages were visited from which three were Bantu dominated and 
one was Baka dominated. From the two CED target villages the one, Nomedjoh, was 
Baka dominated and the other, Nkoyleng, Bantu dominated. The characteristics of 
each village can be found in Table 6.  
 
Table 6. Villages 
Village Project Total 
Inhabitants 
Sample size Total forest 
area 
Nkolenyeng CED 550 
32 1042 ha  
Nomedjoh CED 900 
34 1942 ha  
Messok-Messok WWF 147 
21 1480 ha 
Ndimako WWF 186 
29 n/a 
Etekessang WWF 212 
20 3135 ha  
Zoulabot WWF 198 
14 3254 ha  
 
The CED sites were established in 2011, and the PES contract is renewable in 5 years’ 
periods. The payments were supposed to be given annually, but that has not been the 
reality so far. The villagers have got some money and incentives, but not all that were 
promised.  The objectives of the project were to decrease deforestation and forest 
degradation as well as protect biodiversity and develop the communities. The projects 
are piloting projects of Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF) and are targeted to these 
areas because of severe threat of deforestation and forest degradation.  Also the WWF 
sites were established in 2011 and are renewable in 5 year’s periods. The primary 
objectives were to conserve biodiversity and maintain carbon stocks in the forests. The 
main sources of income of the villages of both CED and WWF sites are presented in 




Table 7. Main sources of income of the villagers 
 
 
In all of the villages the NGOs had formed different groups with different activities 
such as apiculture, agriculture, pig breeding and moabi oil processing. One group was 
trained to monitor the forests by GPS mapping.  All of the villages were community 
forests in government owned land in rural, remote, forested areas.  The drivers for 
deforestation were unsustainable exploitation of timber and other NTFPs as well as 
unsustainable cultivation of cash crops.  
 
Within the projects, the community forest area has been divided into different 
categories such as undisturbed forest, degraded forest, agricultural land and possible 
sacred sites. The projects have trained the members of the village to monitor the state 
of the forest, and according to the level of conservation, payments are given.  
 
5.2. Study Approach 
This thesis employed a case study approach to investigate and provide answers to the 
research questions. Yin (1994) defines case study as “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” Gillham 
(2000) adds that case study seeks evidence from a single case to find answers for the 
specific research questions using multiple different sources of evidence to get 
sufficient data. A case study focuses on understanding and describing the 
I ncome percentage






phenomenon, having the limitation of small sample size that can make it difficult to 
generalize the findings (Woodside, 2010).  
 
The case study was conducted in South-East Cameroon’s rural forested areas of total 
six villages that have had PES piloting projects of Centre of environment and 
development (CED) and World wide fund for nature (WWF) since 2011. The villages 
were chosen strategically, because it represents well the PES projects of Cameroon 
that are not yet very well established (Saldana, 2011). 
 
5.3. Materials and Data Collection 
This study employed mixed methods for data collection, by combining content 
analysis and literature review, questionnaire survey and interviews. Mixed methods is 
a research strategy that answers the research questions by using different sources of 
both qualitative and quantitative data collecting and integrating the different data in a 
same study. (Greene et al., 1989; Hesse-Biber, 2010). The term “multimethods” is used 
when combining either two qualitative methods or two quantitative methods together 
(Hesse-Biber, 2010). To support the used methods, triangulation was also used to 
ensure the validity of the results (Mills et al., 2010). The triangulation was established 
between the documents and the interviews. 
 
5.3.1. Data collection 
The data for this study comes from three different sources: content analysis and 
literature review, interviews at local level with rural populations and indigenous people 
and also with Cameroonian experts and policy makers. The results from content 
analysis and literature review were used to develop protocol for questionnaires and 
interview surveys.  
 
Quantitative data can be used to statistical analyzing and its reliability and validity can 
be tested. The benefit of qualitative data is to cross-check the data and have in-depth 
understanding of the research results (Hesse-Biber, 2010). In this study the data from 
interviews with rural villagers is handled with quantitative methods. The data from 
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interviews with officials is qualitative, and is used to support the findings from content 
analysis of key policy documents and the data from interviews with villagers.  
 
Content analysis has been given many different definitions from different scholars. 
Bryman (2008) defines content analysis as an “approach to the analysis of documents 
and texts that seeks to quantify content in terms of predetermined categories and in a 
systematic and replicable manner”. Bryman (2008) highlights that the key features are 
objectivity and being systematic. Content analysis can be both qualitative and 
quantitative (Saldana, 2011). In this study, the contents of policy documents and 
interviews with officials are handled both by quantitative methods by systematically 
searching and highlighting keywords and phrases. The interviews with officials and 
the local populations are also used for quantitative study by choosing interesting topics 
and phrases that support this study. The questionnaires for both groups can be found 
in the Annex. 
 
After the literature review the context specific content analysis consisted of the policy 
documents of REDD+ and FLEGT as well as the Cameroonian operative legislations 
and the drafts of the coming legislations. The data was analyzed in Google docs by 
searching relevant phrases from the documents and sorting them under different 
thematic areas from Theoretical Framework. The phrases and thematic areas were 
formed from World Bank’s (2009) building blocks of good forest governance, 
Ostrom’s (1990) CPR principles and Ostrom and Schlager’s (1996) different factors 
of tenure which are all presented in chapter 4.  These sections were then analyzed and 
compared together with Cameroonian legislations and the interviews with officials. 
The results can be found on chapter 6.  
 
5.3.2. Questionnaire Survey  
The questionnaire survey was conducted in two levels: with rural populations and with 
experts from different organizations and ministries. The main emphasis with expert 
interviews was on the concept of forest governance, and in the local level questionnaire 
the focus was on the principles of sustainable local forest management. The 




From the six villages the total sample size was 150 interviews. The questionnaire 
consisted of 4 different thematic areas and took from 20 minutes to over an hour each. 
The questionnaire can be found from Annex. The interviews were done face-to-face 
with the help of translator, in most cases inside the respondent's housing. Most of the 
questions were fixed-choice, but there were also open-ended questions. The 
questionnaire can be found in Annex. To have triangulation for the data from 
interviews, in each of the village also focus group discussions were conducted. In each 
discussion group there were 10-15 participants, both women and men and young and 
old. The discussion group discussions were recorded. The data of the interviews was 
analyzed with Excel using descriptive statistics to analyze the empirics.  
 
5.3.3. Face-to-Face Interviews with policy makers and experts 
The number of interviews in policy level remained low because of lack of resources in 
the projects and schedule constraints. The total number of conducted interviews were 
13. The targeted individuals included ministry officials in different ministries as well 
as project coordinators and NGO experts. Additionally, one interview was conducted 
with official from a logging company that was operating in the area of the target 
villages.  The interviews were done during October and November 2015 and 
conducted face-to-face. The benefit from a face-to-face interview is to be able to ask 
additional questions during the meeting.  
 
For each official there were planned questions that were systematically asked from 
every one. In addition, there were questions that were targeted to each individual 
subject to their area of expertise. Since the interviews were semi-informal and the 
officials talked from their own point of view, the interviewer was asking also 
spontaneous questions that helped to understand the thoughts of the official more 
precisely. The officials were chosen as key-informants, who were supposed to have 
key information about the subjects of this thesis. This key-informant method is not to 
present the opinions of the whole informant group but to gather the information they 
personally possess (Lavrakas, 2008).  
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The officials were kept anonymous and no personal information was collected. The 
officials were for example from WWF, CED, IUCN, CIFOR, FODER and MINFOF, 
MINEPDED and MINEPAT. There were both foreign experts as well as 
Cameroonians. The interviewed persons were asked for their consent for recording, 
and only one of them declined. In addition, with recording, notes were taken during 
the interviews.  
 
The data from the officials were analyzed by using Google docs and Microsoft Word. 
First the recorded interviews were transcribed and as with the policy documents, the 
data was assorted under different thematic areas that were later combined in analysis 
with the contents of policy documents.  The different thematic areas were modified 
from World Bank’s (Mundial, 2009) building blocks of good forest governance that 
are presented in Chapter 4. The data from local level was analyzed in Microsoft Excel. 
First the answers were translated from French to English and then inserted into Excel. 
The data was then further analyzed using the descriptive statistics to analyse the 
empirics. 
 
5.5. Limitations of the Study 
The study has many limitations, mainly because of the challenges of cultural and 
language differences and the limited time period for research in Cameroon. The 
number of interviews with the officials remained low (n=13) and this could have 
implications to conclusions drawn. The data from officials is mainly to support the 
literature review and content analysis of the policy documents. It can also be possible, 
that the officials did not speak up their true thoughts maybe not wanting to show their 
organization or institution in bad light. For example, one official clearly stated that 
“illegalities do not come from the ministry” even though there is clear empirical 
evidence that the government of Cameroon is very corrupted and accepting bribes 
especially in the forestry sector (Njoh, 2013; Transparency International, 2015). The 
limited time with the officials might have caused that not all of their thoughts and ideas 
were expressed during the interviews. The challenges with rural local population were 
mainly the language barrier and their lack of understanding of the basic concepts such 





The key findings of this thesis are presented in three sub-sections: 1) the plans of 
FLEGT VPA and REDD+ processes in the context of tenure in Cameroon; 2) 
challenges in forest governance sector; and 3) extent to which rights should be given 
to local communities.  
 
The chapter 6 gives answers on the basic research objectives such as how to ensure the 
full and effective engagement and participation of national stakeholders on tenure and 
access rights and in what extent the rights should be given to locals.  
For the sake of clarity, a term ‘official’ is used when referring to the policy level 
officials, and ‘villager’ when referring to the populations interviewed in rural forested 
villages of Cameroon. 
 
6.1. The role of FLEGT VPA and REDD+ in issues related to land 
tenure in Cameroon 
This sub-section explains the contents of the FLEGT and REDD+ policy documents 
in the context of Cameroon as well as presents what the officials told about the plans 
of FLEGT and REDD+ for tenure and how REDD+ and FLEGT can contribute on 
clear tenure rights of rural populations.   
 
6.1.1. FLEGT VPA  
FLEGT Action Plan identifies strengthening tenure rights as a part of the key policy 
tool and also as a goal. The Cameroonian VPA acknowledges the need for secure 
tenure rights, and they are addressed mainly through the rights of access and 
withdrawal to create clear boundaries on the resources that are allowed to be 
harvested.  The boundaries for logging operations for companies are defined in Annex 
VIII: 
 there is clear delineation of areas where forest resource rights have been 
allocated and the holders of those rights have been identified 
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 the forestry entity respects the logging rules in the land authorized for logging 
Annex VIII also states about the tenure rights of local communities 
 Respect for parties legal tenure or rights of use of land and resources that may 
be affected by timber harvesting rights, where such other rights exist. 
 
In addition, the forest law from 1994 gives legal status for community forest and 
delimits the maximum size of the forest to 5000 hectares. The community forest 
contract is renewable in 25-year-periods and the community is allowed to cut and sell 
timber in within the boundaries set by the government. Table 4 presents the different 
levels of tenure. In community forest the withdrawal and management rights are 
limited by government, and there are no rights for alienation. According to Ostrom 
and Schlager (1996), if there are no management rights, the group has no assurance 
about future and this lessens the probability for acting sustainably. The forest law gives 
only limited user rights to the community.  
 
The officials did not think boundaries as a problem, stating that the boundaries of 
community forestry were clearly defined and respected. The problem about land that 
was allocated for logging operation by MINFOF was with overlapping land titles: 
different ministries are planning different activities under the same land areas.  All the 
officials mentioned unclear land use planning including overlapping of titles as a 
problem in Cameroon. Thirty-one percent of the officials mentioned overlapping land 
titles and lack of transparency as significant challenges in Cameroon. Also the 
difficulty with customary and modern law was mentioned in 38% of the interviews 
with officials.  They raised up an issue that all of the locals do not understand what 
land is theirs and what belongs to government. This is not surprising, since from the 
interviews with villagers it was noticed that 53% from the population had no education 
or only elementary education, and only 15% had college level education. FLEGT VPA 
also addresses the importance of transparency in Annex XI in Article 19: “ensure that 
the work of the JMC is transparent, and that the associated information and results 
are accessible to the public”. Transparency is important factor in both FLEGT and 
REDD+, and also one of the factors in World Bank’s (Mundial, 2009) building blocks 
that are defining the good governance in forest sector.  
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From Ostrom and Schlager (1996) one of the key factors of tenure is exclusion. The 
rights of exclusions are addressed also in VPA: Other users [should] respect for other 
parties’ legal tenure or rights of use of land and resources that may be affected by 
timber harvesting rights where such other rights exist. This has problems in multiple 
levels. The first thing is that in Cameroon the Customary law is not recognized even 
though the local rural people follow it. What was noticeable from both the interviews 
with officials as well as with the locals is that the local people do not know their rights. 
They follow their traditions and are not truly aware who is owner of their land and how 
and who can use the forest. For example, 26% of the villagers surveyed mentioned that 
they own the land, even though it was community forest owned by government. Only 
17,8% from the villagers stated that government owns the land.  Figure 6 presents the 
perceptions of the forest ownerships of the villagers. 
 
 
Figure 6. Perception of the villagers about ownership 
 
Cameroon VPA recognizes the importance of the tenure rights of community forests 
when conducting loggings in their forests in Matrix 6: 
 the community is the beneficiary of a legally awarded community forest and a 
management agreement signed with the administration 
 the community is organized in the form of a legally recognized legal entity 
 The community is the beneficiary of a legally awarded community forest and a 
management agreement signed with the administration 
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The importance of the respect for the community rights was raised within the officials 
and with the villagers.  
 
Participation and engagement of local communities including indigenous people is an 
important factor in Cameroonian VPA. Also the incentives for local communities to 
participate in sustainable forest management and FLEGT are stated in Article 2 as to 
“create and encourage economic opportunities for resident local communities and 
local enterprises” and to “strengthen the capacities of actors in Cameroon by 
encouraging the creation of a favourable climate for investment in the sustainable 
management of forests”. 
 
The interviewed officials reported that the incentives from the development projects 
are insufficient for the local people, but also for the whole Cameroon to sustainably 
manage the forests and participate in the FLEGT process. Forty-six percent from the 
officials told that public participation is a problem because it is not sufficient in their 
opinion. Also the interviewed villagers reported that, in their opinion, the locals were 
not included fully in the planning and decision making processes. Participation is 
considered as crucial factor ensuring the secure tenure and sustainable forest 
governance (Ostrom, 1990; Mundial, 2009; Carodenuto et al, 2014) as well as being 
important for implementing both FLEGT and REDD+ (Colchester, 2006).  
 
FLEGT VPA states in Article 16 that “Cameroon shall regularly consult Cameroon 
stakeholders on the implementation of this Agreement, within a National Monitoring 
Committee or through other consultative platforms, taking into account its legislation 
on the forest and fauna scheme and all the laws and regulations in force governing 
access to information, public participation and access to justice on environmental 
matters”.  The Cameroon VPA (2011, Annex VIII) identifies the following key 
stakeholders:  
 the representatives of the administrations involved, 
 members of parliament, 
 the representatives of the forestry communes (having their own domain, with a 
domain assigned to them by the State or beneficiaries of the forestry tax), 
 the representatives of civil society organisations, 
 the representatives of the private forestry and timber sector, 
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 the unions that are active in the sector. 
 
To have full participation, consultation with only representatives is not following the 
FPIC guidelines.  
 
Since FLEGT VPA’s major target is in the forest sector, the VPA concentrates on the 
legality of the logging operations so that all actions happen in legal, sustainable and 
deliberate manner. The main pressure is to improve governance and through that 
process also reduce poverty and have development.  Existence of community forests 
and their rights are noticed and taken into account. Also the need for local participation 
in decision making is noticed. VPA considers different governance factors important, 
but do not heavily concentrate on them. One of the officials told that FLEGT follows 
the forest management plans and legislations, and if the forest is not under any plan or 
the planning is unclear, FLEGT cannot work properly.  
 
6.1.2. REDD+  
In the context of tenure, the Cameroon R-PP (2013) has targeted three main aspects: 
(i) enhancement of government’s rule of law and coherence; (ii) participation of locals 
in planning, decision making and implementation; and (iii) 
recognition of tenure rights.  
 
Though the Cameroon R-PP (2013) highlights the participation of the local indigenous 
people, it is mentioned that only seven percent of the regional consultation participants 
were indigenous people. The R-PP further elaborated the role of local participation: 
 in addition to their official presence on the steering committee … the 
indigenous peoples will participate during various discussions and in decision 
making concerning the strategic options to be adopted, according to the 
consultation plan that will be developed (R-PP Cameroon, 2013, p. 13) 
 particular importance will be given to the indigenous peoples with 
consultations that will be conducted according to an appropriate 
methodology.  the principle is to obtain the free and prior consent of the 
stakeholders using participatory-focused planning methods that encourage 
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listening and the integration of local knowledge allowing the local 
communities to be active participants and not passive beneficiaries (R-PP 
Cameroon, 2013, p. 30) 
 the participatory process will also make it possible to ensure transparency in 
decision-making, improve the empowerment of the players, involve them in 
making decisions and in the implementation and monitoring-evaluation of the 
actions (R-PP Cameroon, 2013, p. 26)  
 
During the fieldwork, it was observed that the consultation plan mentioned in R-PP 
was not yet put in place. Even though there were plans to have REDD+ work as a 
bottom-up - mechanism, this is not yet achieved. Forty-six percent of the officials 
asserted that participation is a problem, and 23% of them mentioned that locals even 
do not know what is REDD+ and its benefits. This also came up during questionnaire 
surveys. Seventeen percent of the villages participating in the Carbon PES project 
population were not aware of the project. They also did not have wide understanding 
about the reasons and benefits of the project. Forty-six percent claimed that they were 
not consulted during the preparation phase, and 25% was not satisfied with their own 
involvement. 
 
REDD policy documents do not consider tenure as crucial issues, though the respect 
of property rights in the context of customary law and community rights were 
mentioned few times:  
 community forests and communal forests will be given serious consideration 
and specific actions may be dedicated to them [such as] strengthening the 
management of community forests and identification of the conditions in which 
communal forests could guarantee over time a reduction of deforestation and 
degradation (R-PP Cameroon, 2013, p.56) 
 needs expressed by local and autochthonous communities point in the direction 
of harmonization between modern land law and customary land law in order 
to take into consideration the concerns and needs of local and autochthonous 
communities: facilitation simplification of procedures to acquire land titles (R-
PP Cameroon, 2013, p. 58) 
 [there exists] inadequacy with respect to the rights practiced by the local 
communities. its application is thus uncertain, and the conflicts involving 
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disputes between traditional practices and the regulations are increasing 
continually (R-PP Cameroon, 2013, p. 42)  
 
In Cameroon there already exists some piloting REDD+ community projects that are 
trying to bring development to the communities. In Cameroon, the poor governance 
with strong vested interest of political economic elites in the natural resource 
governance is slowing down the REDD+ process and making it complex.  
 
Cameroon forest tenure law from 1994 states that “Community forests shall have single 
management plans approved by the services in charge of forests. Such plans shall be 
drawn up at the behest of the communities concerned in accordance with conditions 
laid down by decree. All activities in a community forest shall comply with its 
management plan.”  The proponents of PES projects covered in this study have given 
attention to sustainable management of community forests by forming different 
sources of income that were supposed to give incentives for stopping illegal activities. 
On the other hand, the PES projects delimited conservation zones from the community 
forest areas, and trained the villagers to monitor the status of their forest themselves. 
The villagers were informed that if they do not respect the boundaries of the 
conservation zones, the payments the PES project will be reduced accordingly. The 
threat of not having the full payments from the PES project was supposed to be an 
incentive for sustainable forest management and forest conservation. 
 
The difference between customary and modern law is still a concern for 23% of the 
officials. The literature also paints it as a big problem in Cameroon (Njoh, 2013).  
Furthermore, what could be noticed from the villages is, for example, that the local 
people did not know who owned the forest and for many of them even the concept of 
owning the forest was unfamiliar. A representative from a logging company that was 
operating in the same area that the target villages were situated told that even though 
there are clear negotiations with the villagers about the coming logging operations, 
they still break the formed rules by entering into the areas of felling. This comment 
supports the idea that the villagers find it difficult to understand the rules and 
boundaries regarding the forests ownership and tenure.  
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In the governmental level lack of resources were seen as one of the main contributor 
as listed in Cameroon’s R-PP as causes of deforestation and forest degradation. This 
came up from the interviews with officials but also in the documents of R-PP: 
• the laws are not adequately applied in Cameroon for various reasons. this situation 
has adverse effects on the state of the national governance. the most common problem 
related to forest governance is the absence of any regulations and the insufficient 
capacities of the human and financial resources (R-PP Cameroon, 2013, p. 37) 
• forest governance in Cameroon remains weakened by the insufficient enforcement of 
laws on sustainable forest management (R-PP Cameroon, 2013, p. 46) 
 
When interviewed the proponents of the PES projects of CED and WWF, the problem 
with insufficient financial and human resources came up. Also the villagers raised that 
as a problem and stated that they want someone to stay with them in the village to be 
present and manage the project. The villagers also wanted to have more incentives 
from the projects which was not possible at this stage of the projects. 
 
Thirty-eight percent from the officials told that a key problem with tenure rights is the 
lack of political will. The governance actors do not have adequate urge to apply the 
laws and tenure rights for the rural population. Two of the officials also mentioned that 
the state does not want to give full rights to the community so that the state can stay in 
lead and control the land better. This corresponds well with the Cameroonian land law 
from 1974 which states that “The State shall be the guardian of all lands. It may in this 
capacity intervene to ensure national use of land or in the imperative interest of defense 
or the economic policies of the nation”. 
 
Overlapping of the land titles and lack of coordination between different land use 
strategies and policies were also noticed. As mentioned in chapter 6.1.1., when 
analyzing FLEGT VPA, 31% of the officials were worried about the overlapping land 
titles. Also in literature this came up as a major problem (Njoh, 2013). Cameroon’s R-
PP (p.42) states that: “The use of forest space is governed by forest zoning. the mining 
code is, for its part, operational and awards mining permits without necessarily 
referring to the other existing sectors. the same is true for the farming code and the 
farming policy, which have their own ambitions, unrelated to the other uses of space”.  
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6.1.3. Contribution of REDD+ and FLEGT to secure tenure 
The Challenges are looked through the World Bank’s ‘Building blocks for forest 
governance’ and the data is gathered both from the interviews with officials as well as 
with the rural population.  
 
The officials were asked about their perceptions on how REDD+ and FLEGT can 
contribute to the tenure security in Cameroon. Thirty-one percent of them told that as 
yet there has been no contribution from either of the mechanism to tenure. Two of the 
officials stated that FLEGT has no connection with tenure, and having secure tenure 
has no connections with FLEGT VPA. Other officials about FLEGT told that FLEGT 
can improve the existing rights and enhance the level of respect of the tenure rights. 
Nonetheless, one of those FLEGT officials still stated that FLEGT can even jeopardize 
community rights if the communities shall have possibility to make contracts about 
their forests with logging operators. This can cause unfair agreements with companies 
and degrade the forests of the local communities. 
 
Some of the officials (31%) were worried that REDD+ is not having real impact in the 
preparation of the forestry law draft. The present law or the new draft of forestry law 
does not take PES into consideration as it does take the forest exploitation. The new 
law aims to clarify the past law and refine the definitions and concepts of different 
forest titles. The new forest law also aims to delete the limitation of the size of 
community forestry and define the rights autochthonous people to vulnerable people. 
In addition, the new law adds requirements for evidence of customary ownership by 
demanding signature of the relevant customary authority to prove the customary 
ownership of land area.  
 
Also two of the officials stated that REDD+ cannot contribute on tenure security but 
the others told that REDD+ can give support on strengthening the tenure 
rights.  Majority of the officials (62%) stated that REDD+ is a valuable tool to 
communicate with the locals; for FPIC, consultation and sensibilisation. It has given 
new resources to share information between different actors and learn from each other. 
REDD+ was also noted to be helpful in forming the benefit sharing systems among 
rural population as well as helping civil society and other Climate Change related 
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actors to have cross-sectorial platform for communication. One official told that the 
main benefit from REDD+ was to get international money and knowledge for forest 
conservation. On the other hand, some scholars (e.g. Phelps and Agrawal, 2010) are 
worried that REDD+ might reduce the possibilities of locals to contribute on their 
livelihoods and decrease the level of decentralization.  
 
6.2. Sustainable common-pool resource management  
Ostrom and Schlager (1996) define five different factors that are defining tenure: 
access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation. The visited villagers have 
mainly rights for access, withdrawal of some resources and exclusion, but their 
perceptions about their rights were different, what can be noticed from Table 8. The 
majority of officials (79%) stated that the locals should have ownership rights. Some 
officers still noticed that there should be at least some control over the resources even 
though the locals own it, so that misuses or illegal land leases over the resource. When 
interviewed the villagers, they had different views of what they would do if they owned 
the land they use. In Figure 7 are listed the different uses for land when asked what 
they would do to it. 
 
 
Figure 7. The local people’s planned use of land 
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Seventy-seven percent of of the villagers stated that that they will not lease the land 
for companies if they own it.  Eighty-eight percent of the villagers also told when asked 
that if they owned the land it would be at least somehow important for them to conserve 
it, use it as a timber resource (80%) or use it partly for agriculture (97%). Furthermore, 
it can be noticed from village survey that they did not have clear understanding about 
their rights. Even that they had rights of access, withdrawal, management and 
exclusion, they did not feel that way. From the table 8 it can be seen what the villagers’ 
perception about the tenure rights is. Tenure cannot be secure if the villagers don’t 
know what their rights are and what are not.  
 
Sixty-eight percent of the interviewed villagers had perception that they can exclude 
outside users from using the resource and 66% that they can manage the forest as they 
want (Table 8). Sixty-six percent also thought that if someone is using their forest 
resource, they can have compensation. 35% from the interviewed villagers stated that 
they are the owners of the land, which tells about the low understanding about the 
tenure rights they have.  
 




For the continuity of the sustainable common-pool resource management, Ostrom 
(1990) defined eight principles that should be followed (Table 5).   
The community forests had clearly defined boundaries, but again the perception of the 
villagers varied. Only 11% of them told that the area of community forestry was clearly 
bounded. What comes to congruence between appropriation and provision rules and 
local conditions, the working groups that were created for PES projects to give 
incentives for protecting the forests were not all suitable for local conditions, and the 
coordinators did not provide enough training for locals to gain from the incentives, 
such as from pig breeding program.  
 
The collective choice arrangements in the villages were handled through so called 
‘entities’ that were chosen to make decisions on the behalf of the communities. In 
addition, each village has village chief and head of the community forestry. According 
to PES project proponents, when the PES projects were introduced to the villages, the 
facilitators were trying to inform all of the villagers and take them into the decision 
making. However, 17% of the villagers were never heard about the PES project, and 
25% of them were not satisfied about their participation in the planning of PES 
projects. Entity was also the conflict resolution mechanism of the villagers.  
 
The monitoring of the resource was conducted so that the PES projects trained the 
villagers themselves to monitor the state of the forest resource with the equipment they 
provided for the villagers. For those who broke the rules of community forests, there 
were sanctions, although the interviewed villagers told that it is not very likely to get 
caught when doing illegal activities such as cutting trees without permit.  
 
Even though there were the entities and leaders in the communities, there were also 
external authorities in the villages because of the PES projects. Despite of the PES 
project officials, the rights to organize institutions are not challenged by external 
government authorities even though they helped the villagers to new institutions inside 
the villages such as activity groups for having additional income. Ultimately, it was 




6.3. In what extent should the tenure rights be transferred to locals?  
When asked about the most important right the villagers want to have for the forest or 
what they would like to have, 11% stated property rights. Mainly the answer was to 
have withdrawal rights (30%). One of the problem encountered during the data 
collection was that villagers faced difficulty in answering imaginary questions e.g. like 
“what if you had…” or to understand abstract concepts such as ownership.  
 
Some officials (31%) stated that no ownership or additional rights should be given to 
the communities. The main argument for that was that there are enough rights for the 
communities - but they are not secure or that the locals do not know their rights. Some 
officials (54%) were of the opinion that the locals should own the land, but 15% told 
that there should be some external control even though the ownership would lay with 
the locals. From the officials, 15% stated that the locals would not sell the land if they 
owned it and if they felt secure over it. This means, that the locals can be sure that the 
area is under their use also in the future with the same resources. From all the officials, 
54% expressed that the locals do not know what their rights are. For example, one of 
the coordinators of the PES projects explained the situation: “Problem is that they do 
not understand. We explain, and in the end we notice that they do not understand”. The 
Table 9 presents the arguments from officials about the local ownership of forests.  
 





No ownership/Additional rights 31%
Locals should own the land 54%
Own the land but have external control 25%
Locals would not sell the land if owned 15%
Locals do not know what their rights are 54%
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Some officials (23%) asserted that the traditional and customary land rights of local 
and indigenous communities were not respected. One official stated that there should 
be more compensation rights, and other stated that the user rights are most important 
for the locals. One suggestion was that the locals should not own the land, but it should 
belong to a certain project that would make sure the land is not used for wrong 
purposes. Especially WWF in Cameroon considered the rights of community forests 
important, and was establishing new community forest areas.  The villages in Ngoyla-
Mintom project that are evaluated in this study were also community forests 
established by WWF. Neither the WWF nor the locals owned the land, but WWF 
helped the villages to get security over the area and maintained the user rights by 
forming the community forest contract. WWF also incentivized the villagers to 
sustainably manage their forests. Through these kind of projects especially REDD+ 
could make contribution for the factors the officials proposed as challenges. On the 
other hand, FLEGT could concentrate on having the traditional land rights under the 
knowledge of the ministries to reduce the overlapping land titling over the traditionally 






The results of this study show that even though there is ongoing process of both 
FLEGT and REDD+, the progress is very slow and yet has had no influence on the 
tenure rights. In Cameroon there is already ongoing process of drafting new tenure and 
forest law, but these three processes have no proper communication between them. 
The achievements thus far compared in the delay of the FLEGT and REDD+ processes 
are multi-level problems. The greater part of the officials claimed that REDD+ and 
FLEGT can have influence on the tenure rights of local population.  
 
The aim of this section is to compare the results with previous research findings from 
different countries participating in both REDD+ and FLEGT VPA processes and to 
critically evaluate the research objectives, research approach and the methodology. 
This chapter is organized as follows: the first section describes the overall challenges 
of the study, second subchapter focuses on the challenges in governance level and the 
third subchapter handles the local level.  
 
7.1. Local level challenges 
Sunderlin et al (2014) argue that it is most important to involve those in REDD+ 
processes who are living in the forests, since they are the ones who are implementing 
the possible projects and also losing or gaining from them. The one of the objectives 
of PES projects considered in this study was to create incentives to conserve forests 
and one of the aim was also to create more secure tenure.  
 
One of the most significant problems of tenure rights at the local level is that the local 
population does not have clear understanding about the tenure conditions. As stated 
earlier, the locals do not know their rights or who owns the land that they are using. 
Access to knowledge is important factor defining who can use the resource or not 
(Ribot and Peluso, 2003). If the perception of the villagers is that there is no secure 
tenure, they do not keep their forest as if the tenure was secure. Chhatre and Agrawal 
(2009) reported that increased autonomy and secure tenure of local communities 
contributes to increased forest conservation increasingly. Arts (2014) also mentioned 
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that if the tenure is secured, the local populations feel responsive over the forest. When 
asked villagers to define ownership, they said it is something that prevents others from 
entering their forest area, and gives the freedom having the forest for themselves, 
freedom to do what they want with it. It came out that in some cases the villagers have 
had problems with excluding outside users what should be the right of their community 
forest. When asked about the perceptions, 68% of the villagers told that they have the 
exclusion right. The most important right to them was withdrawal (30%), access (19%) 
and property rights (11%), and only 5% mentioned exclusion as the most important 
right. One explanation for this inconsistency between information is again the lack of 
education. ‘Ownership’ and ‘right’ are concepts that are difficult to comprehend for 
the local villagers. Sunderlin et al. (2014) point out that the problems to exclude 
outsiders is not prominent only for Cameroon even though they state that in Cameroon 
the tenure insecurity is highest from the studied countries: Tanzania Brazil, Indonesia 
and Vietnam. They present that in Tanzania as well as in Cameroon the outsiders are 
usually from neighboring villages whereas in Brazil, Indonesia and Vietnam the 
outsiders are also large-scale commercial farmers (Sunderlin et al., 2014). Robinson 
et al. (2014) are arguing that rights of management and exclusion are experienced as 
necessary in communities. The projects of CED and WWF are pursuing to have greater 
number of community forests in the areas they are already working, and to guarantee 
that all the rights are followed. The majority of the officials were on the opinion that 
it is important for the local communities to have rights over the forests they are living 
in. On the contrary, 31% of the officials stated that no additional rights should be given 
to communities and that the present state is sufficient.  
 
The lack of education could be observed in the visited villages. As stated earlier, 53% 
from the interviewed locals had a very low level of education or no education. From 
the interviews with locals it came out that especially with Bakas the education is a 
difficult matter. There are no sufficient education opportunities in the villages, and if 
the parents send their offspring to neighboring Bantu - dominated villagers, the Baka 
children easily get mistreated. This does not encourage for education. Another factor 
that is hindering the education is the use of alcohol in the rural villages. The villagers 
did not understand alcohol being harmful, and because the greater part of the villagers 
started to get intoxicated towards the evenings it was difficult to conduct the 
interviews. During the field work in the villages, it was observed that alcohol had very 
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bad effect on the villagers and it also reduced their capacity of understanding. For 
example, the consequences of logging were very difficult for them to understand 
because they had so big craving for money and instant benefits. In this kind of 
situation, it is not maybe the best option if the locals can decide everything by 
themselves since it is difficult for them to think long-term benefits and they might 
negotiate contracts that are not beneficial for them. Then again, it is not acceptable to 
let someone decide over them in the country of high level of corruption and self-benefit 
seeking officials.  The statement that local management reduces pressure from 
unsustainable use of resources (Ostrom, 1990; Arts, 2014; Panayotou and Ashton, 
1992) needs to be critically examined in this situation.  
 
Development and education are relatively difficult to bring into the communities since 
their remote location. The road infrastructure is very primitive and almost impassable 
during some times of the year. The logging companies have been building roads 
mainly for their own purposes but the road culture is very hostile. However, the roads 
do not bring benefits or development for the communities who have only few 
motorbikes and no cars and the closest urban areas are hours away. Compared to 
Bantus, Bakas are more illiterate and thus it is difficult for them to understand what 
their rights are or possible benefits or consequences. One Baka prominent issue was 
that the Bantu considers Bakas as a slaves. The Baka does not have as much decision 
making power as Bantu, and they are not respected as much as Bantus in communities. 
From the villages studied, tenure insecurity was higher in Baka dominated villages 
than in Bantu dominated.  Even it was stated in 1994 Forestry law that inside the 
community forest there is protected areas that should not be used for agriculture, and 
even it was the rule of the PES projects, 32% of the villagers still stated that they 
understand at least to some extent if someone cultivates in the zones of conservation.  
 
Robinson et al. (2014) conceptualized the impact of tenure on deforestation through 
economic theories. From the viewpoint of game-theoretical models, insecure tenure 
increases the costs of protection and causes lower optimal resource stocks or 
deforestation. Optimal investment models as well as cost-benefit analysis shows that 
insecure tenure lowers forest stocks and optimal forest rotation models such as 
Faustmann model suggest that insecure tenure shortens optimal timber rotation and 
makes people favor more agricultural activities (Robinson et al., 2014). Seventy-seven 
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percent of the villagers stated that agriculture is their main income. Attempts to 
increase government control can cause increased insecurity in tenure rights, 
deforestation and land races (Robinson et al., 2014). Insecure tenure also encourages 
seeking short-term profit from land such as agricultural income or illegal activities, 
and discourages investments on long-term that would reduce deforestation and forest 
degradation (Damnyag et al, 2012). From the interviews with villagers it can be 
noticed that they do not want to lose their forest. They state that they want to conserve 
the forest for their children and grandchildren, and that if they owned the forest, they 
would conserve it better. Along the same line, 56% the villagers stated that in case of 
survival, they would do illegal activities and break the forestry rules and exploit the 
natural resources.  
 
Government's inability to properly manage and monitor forest sector is encouraging 
illegal and unsustainable actions and weakening the security of tenure in rural areas. 
Governance failures disable good transparent decision making and enable illegal land 
acquisitions, so called land grabbing (Anseeuw et al., 2011). Increased craving for 
food, biofuels and timber is changing the land use rights from local populations to 
large-scale commercial use. Without legal ownership the rural populations have no 
possibilities to fight against dispossessions of land or exploitations of their resources 
(Knight, 2010). Especially the lack of political will and corrupted officials are stated 
as challenges in Cameroon’s forestry sector. The government is driving development 
objectives as stated in the country’s development ’vision 2035’, leading to growing 
need of natural resources by allowing forest exploitation in growing numbers. The 
customary land rights of local population are not respected and the titling procedure is 
so complicated that the locals do not have resources or knowledge to get their 
ownership a legal status. Self-benefit driving officials or village heads are negotiating 
unsustainable logging contracts that do not benefit the greater part of the communities. 
Concerning PES projects, 17% of the villagers had not even heard about the projects. 
Lawlor et al., (2010) state that if the populations are engaged to (REDD+) projects, the 
projects will be more effective and will reduce deforestation and degradation by 
engaging the population to conservation objectives.  
 
Carbon markets are demanding land for reforestation and carbon storing (Anseeuw et 
al., 2014). Legality is important for land acquirers because they don’t want to risk their 
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investments on ownership issues (Anseeuw et al., 2014; Barro and Franco, 2010). In 
many cases the land acquisitions are defined as illegal because governments are 
providing buyers land areas that are occupied by locals, and by customary law owned 
by them, without their consent (Knight, 2010). Sometimes the same land area can be 
allocated to different land uses and interest groups. Land grabbing is not only ethically 
questionable but also has negative impacts on livelihoods and deforestation and forest 
degradation (Anseeuw et al., 2014). One of the officials stated that the locals are very 
afraid of land grabbing. In other interviews this did not come up as a typical challenge 
in Cameroon. However, in the conversations with the officials it came up that there 
have been situations that government has prohibited mining or logging permits in areas 
that have been inhabited by rural populations. On the other hand, the conversations 
with state actors did not reveal this, or either land grabbing, present in Cameroon. 
 
7.2. Governance Level 
The government-based management has proved to be problematic in Cameroon 
because of the multiple difficulties such as corruption and overlapping land titles.   
What came up in the interviews with officials, the main problem with tenure rights in 
Cameroon is the lack of political will to make changes and reforms. The reasons that 
government officials do not want to give full ownership rights to locals are numerous; 
they might want to have possible benefits for themselves and they want to stay in 
control over the forest resources, even governmental control has been stated as 
problematic solution for natural resource management (Ostrom, 1990, Anseeuw et al., 
2011). The officials as well as the R-PP for Cameroon (2013) identified challenges 
such as lack of transparency, overlapping land titles, insufficient public participation, 
corruption and lack of incentives for sustainable forest use.   These all are parts of the 
Building blocks of good forest governance from World Bank (Mundial, 2009). 
Sunderlin et al. (2014) underline that tenure must be addressed to reward the person 
who is in charge but also to identify the person who is accountable in case of failure. 
It seems that in Cameroon there are the people who should benefit and get rewarded 
from the positive outcomes, but it stays unclear who truly is in charge if there are 
problems with land allocation.  
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REDD+ might not yet have a significant contribution at the governmental level or in 
drafting the new laws, but it has started many piloting projects in Cameroon, and 
established platforms for civil society to work towards development and conservation 
objectives. As Ostrom (1990) outlined, the locals need some ways to get their word 
count, and REDD+ can be an external facilitator to help in this process.  Somorin et 
al. (2014) remind that the NGO’s that are working for REDD+ can have more 
knowledge than state actors, and that they are working as an important link between 
the locals and the government’s actors. Also the awareness and information about 
REDD+ processes are spread at every level through the NGOs (Somorin et al., 2014). 
For example, in Republic of Congo the NGOs distributed data about both FLEGT and 
REDD+ processes for stakeholders and promoted the transparency by facilitating 
participatory meetings with both actors (Proforest, 2014).  Daniels and Walker (2001) 
introduce the collaborative learning that involves all stakeholders and transparently 
gets the information to every actor. In Cameroon this kind of action would be crucial 
in order to have the actors from FLEGT and REDD+ to cooperate more effectively. 
Cameroon’s R-PP (2013) raises up the notion that lessons should be learned from other 
frameworks such as FLEGT VPA, but so far this kind of learning has not been very 
active. Especially important for these processes would be to measure and monitor 
forest resources together in order to more efficiently allocate resources (Proforest, 
2014). Somorin et al (2014) argue that for REDD+ in Cameroon it is absolutely vital 
to involve also private sector that is a significant driver of deforestation and forest 
degradation. Since it is already taking part in FLEGT this is also one point of possible 
cooperation between different actors in Cameroon’s forest sector.  
 
The lack of cooperation is also prominent not only between FLEGT and REDD+ 
processes but also between other actors. Somorin et al (2014) and also Dkamela (2011) 
suggest that MINFOF should take a bigger role in REDD+ processes together with 
MINEPDED and other ministries.    
 
An officer from a logging company claimed in a discussion that his company is 
working in collaboration with a local NGO and sensitizing rural villagers and 
explaining their rights to them. He told that before conducting logging operations in 
the surroundings of a community forestry, his company requires that there are people 
from every age group and both sexes to be heard and asked of what they want for 
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compensation. The officer told that certification and FLEGT has made these things 
better. He stated that now it is easier to sustain continuous communication between 
the company and the communities and prevent conflicts. Now they know it is 
important to stop illegal activities, not only logging but also poaching, and raise 
awareness that illegal activities are not sustainable. There are also unexpected 
auditings from NGOs that are checking that everything goes as planned. Based on this 
interview it seems that FLEGT is having some influence on securing the tenure in sites 
that are near logging operations. Similar reports were heard in the interviews with 
villagers. Even though REDD+ promotes FPIC guidelines, it seems that in reality it is 
more difficult than in theory. Even though the coordinators of the PES projects in told 
that they have informed the locals about the coming projects, the results show that the 
knowledge was not comprehensive. Sunderlin et al (2014) underline that following 
FPIC is very crucial to effective REDD+ processes, even though it can be a challenge 
to explain all the concepts to the locals. They tell that in some REDD+ processes the 
project coordinators do not even tell the locals what is REDD+ so that the 
communities’ expectations do not raise too high. In the villages of CED and WWF the 
project was known as PES, but the locals did not have clear understanding about the 
coming benefits. Also some payments were delayed which may reduce the confidence 
on the projects. It is very important to involve all the stakeholders even if it may slow 
the process, because it will make it more effective in long term when all of the 
stakeholders have adequate knowledge about the hoped outcomes of the projects as 
well as the means to achieve the outcomes (Proforest, 2014).  
 
In 1999, Campbell introduced Planner’s triangle which shows how equity, economic 
growth and conservation conflict in governance. If there is a need for economic growth 
and conservation, the result is a resource conflict. Those who crave for economic 
growth are resisting the regulations for exploitation and those who crave conservation 
want to conserve the resources for present and future (Campbell, 1999). In Cameroon 
the government’s urge for development goals is hindering the conservation efforts in 
a time that they are most needed. Campbell finds problems also when equity and 
conservation values conflict. He is discussing how the poor population is not having 
any incentives on protecting the nature but either the governmental level is not having 
incentives on protecting the nature. In many cases the conservation has been seen 
slowing the economic growth and growing inequalities between rich and poor nations 
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(Campbell, 1999). This problem represents Cameroon’s situation well. REDD+ is 
trying to give incentives to local populations for conservation through PES projects 
even though the projects are not yet working well. The incentives for government for 
conservation cannot be seen yet, and they are not articulated in the existing REDD+ 
policy documents. REDD+ is trying to give incentives to government by creating value 
and markets for the carbon that are stored in forests (Somorin et al., 2014). On the 
other hand, FLEGT addresses that incentives for sustainable forest management and 
reduction of illegal logging, are coming in form of growing income for state when the 
state can have their share from the incomes of logging operations. Additionally, the 
reduction of corruption and growing transparency are increasing efficiency of 
government and can work as an incentive. One hindering factor for functioning 
FLEGT VPA in Cameroon is that the timber export from Cameroon to EU is declining, 
and the main exporter, China, is not taking part in FLEGT (Chan and Peng, 2015).  
 
As brought up earlier, two officials stated that the government wants to stay in control 
over the land and does not want give full ownership over the land to local communities. 
This is contradicting with the notion of many scholars (g.e. Ostrom, 1990, Ribot and 
Peluso, 2003) that the local management brings sustainable forest management more 
likely than government management. Arts (2014) sees government ownership of 
natural resources causing overexploitation, insufficient management, illegal activities 
and corruption. As Ostrom (1990) states, the government wants to own the forest to 
reduce unsustainable exploitation, but this has not been working effectively (Ostrom, 
1990, Ribot and Peluso, 2003).  Local management is seen having positive social 
benefits such as greater equity, democracy (Ribot and Peluso, 2003) and justice (Arts, 
2014).  Natural resources are important to local populations because it is their main 
source of income whereas for government it is one of the sources of wealth (Ribot and 
Peluso, 2003), and especially the densely forested areas and valuable timber species 
are declared for government (Arts, 2014).  
 
Even though REDD+ has been seen as an instrument for transferring the management 
rights from government to local level (Arts, 2014) and in Cameroon has been 
promoting community forest management through PES projects, Arts (2014) argues 
that REDD+ is not promoting decentralization but only strengthens centralized 
management of forest because the communities are dependent on external authorities 
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and donors. The projects evaluated in this study had the problem that even though the 
contract had been made, the incentives for forest conservation were insufficient and 
did not reach the village as often as promised. In the interviews in the village it came 
up that there were people in the villages that started to lose trust in the projects. Ostrom 
(1990) reminds that for effective local management it is important that all of the 
participants have similar interests. This was already problem from the start, since two 
of the villages had to be divided in two; those who were in favor of logging and those 
who were in favor of conservation.  
 
7.3. Evaluation of the study  
This study consists of three different sources of data: the content analysis of key policy 
documents, expert interviews and householder interviews in remote forested areas of 
Cameroon. The data from rural villagers is numerous and represents well the villages 
that have just started the PES projects. Also the data for literature review and content 
analysis of key policy documents was comprehensive and vastly analyzed.  The chosen 
approach supports the decided research objectives satisfactorily. All of the research 
questions are not comprehensively answered, due to the problems with interviews as 
well as the incompletely chosen study approach and questionnaires. 
 
 The new findings apply mainly to the villages visited, and cannot be vastly 
generalized. The time spent in data collection was not sufficient, and more data would 
have improved the quality of the study. 
 
The specific challenges for the local interviews were the cultural and linguistic 
differences. In most cases the interviews were conducted with translator and that might 
have influenced the results. Also the translators themselves might have influenced to 
the results with their own opinions that they imposed to the respondents even though 
they got training for their duty. All the respondents did not have clear understanding 





Cameroon’s forest resources are disappearing and there are no real political will to 
address that. The government is driving its Development 2035 objectives and states 
clearly that they do conservation only for development, not for conservation.  If the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve (Kuznets, 1950) is considered, the conservation is not 
in the prior objectives of state until the hoped growth is achieved and the state has 
enough wealth to consider also environmental values. Cameroon is now reaching for 
economic growth and the priority is not on conservation.  
 
In Cameroon, the local populations have very little role in protecting their livelihoods. 
The rural populations are very dependent on their livelihoods, and it was for example 
stated in one focus group discussion that forest is “notre vie, notre route, notre l’ecole, 
notre l’hopital”; our life, our road, our school, our hospital”.  They have their own 
natural religion and sacred sites in the forest and they have also conservation values. 
Especially the Bakas are considered as ‘guardians of the forest’. As stated earlier in 
this thesis, scientific studies (eg. Ostrom, 1990; Arts, 2014) have reported that 
governmentally managed forests are not as sustainable as locally managed. Also, as 
shown in the Result section of this study, for the locals it is important to own the forest 
and to have possibility to exclude outsiders. This could be one point of focus for both 
FLEGT and REDD+ to achieve their wanted targets. The land issues in Cameroon are 
very complex at many levels, and to solve the complexity Cameroon might need some 
external help. The incentives of REDD+ and FLEGT for both Cameroon’s government 
and local populations to conserve the forested areas need to be sufficient to accept the 
external help and change the land use and planning mechanisms.  
 
The forest and tenure laws are now under revision in Cameroon, and the worry is that 
conservational values are not taken enough in consideration. The rate of deforestation 
and forest degradation is growing and there is a severe pressure on natural resources. 
The government of Cameroon has not given very big role for civil society or REDD+ 
on drafting the new laws, and both the FLEGT and REDD+ are not given big role in 
the governance of forest resources. Especially REDD+ has still a long way to go for 
taking part in managing the forests and the process has been remarkably slow. The role 
of private sector in deforestation is high in Cameroon, and to have it involved the 
 65 
incentives must be created for both government actors and private sector operators to 
sustainably and ethically use the forest resources. This would be an advantage to both 
REDD+ and FLEGT to achieve their targets and the mechanisms should find ways to 
cooperate in this sector.   
 
Both FLEGT and REDD+ are addressing tenure in their international and national 
plans. However, neither of the mechanisms have had significant influence on the 
tenure conditions in Cameroon. The situation concerning tenure rights in community 
forests are not alarming, but the locals’ erroneous perception about their rights is 
causing unsecure tenure. Furthermore, the locals feel they cannot exclude outsiders 
from the resource and they wish they could do whatever they want for the forest they 
perceive as their own. If there are establishments of new community forest projects in 
Cameroon, there should be good plans for giving alternative options for income if their 
rights of using the forest are reduced and the locals do not feel free to decide over 
themselves. The government of Cameroon already has policies for community 
forestry, but external help is needed to help the locals establishing community forest 
areas. Cameroon has great potential to conserve its forests and community forest 
projects are a good way to harness the locals to protect their surroundings. If the locals 
feel secure over their forests, they are more likely to sustainably use them and conserve 
them. Both FLEGT and REDD+ in Cameroon should give more attention for securing 
the tenure of locals to achieve their targets.  
 
To make a difference, REDD+ and FLEGT could concentrate on the education of local 
populations, since the lack of understanding of the basic concepts is prominent in the 
villages. Information sharing and education are factors that benefit both mechanisms 
and should be considered as key factors when establishing collaboration between 
FLEGT and REDD+. Collaborative learning that should involve all the stakeholders 
including government, NGO’s as well as REDD+ and FLEGT would bring more 
transparency and could speed up the projects since there would be more knowledge 
and information available. REDD+ in Cameroon have stated that they should learn 
from FLEGT VPA, and to have this kind of collaborative learning between the 
processes there should be first greater transparency between the mechanisms.  Also 
some teamwork is needed to share the documents and make plans together for the 
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Annex 1: Questionnaire for the local villagers 
 
Enquête Ménage sur l’évaluation des sauvegardes au Cameroun 
Site  du projet:  WWF  CED   
Village/communauté:  _______________     
Sexe:  Feminin    Masculin    
Nombre total de ménages:       
Superficie totale des terres (ha):       
La superficie forestière totale 
(ha): 
      
Niveau de education   Elementaire   Secondaire   College/Uni 
Revenu total/an (cfa):_____________________     
Les principales sources de revenus pour le ménage: 1* 2 3 4 5 
Agriculture et élevage      
Forêt et non forestières      
Chasse      
Le travail salarié, boutique, entreprise        
Autre      
*1 signifie la plus importante source de revenus pour le ménage 
 
1. Questions en relation avec le consentement libre informé préalable des 
individus sur les projets FLEGT/ REDD+ 
 Questions oui Non Ne sais pas 
/ 
autres 
1.1 Connais-tu de quoi il s’agit dans le Projet?    
1.2 Si oui, quel est le but du projet ? Ex. forêt de protection, conservation etc) 
 
1.3 Est-ce que  les villageois ont été impliqués  dans la 
prise des décisions quand le projet devait ou ne devait 
pas être implémenté ?  
   
 Comment les décisions pour rejoindre le projet ont-ils été prises?  Qui 
décide ? Ex. assemblée de la communauté; Leaders etc… 
 
1.4 Est-ce que les villageois ont été impliqués dans la 
phase du planning des activités du projet ? 
   
1.5 Les villageois ont-ils été impliqués dans la phase de 
mise en œuvre  du projet?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
   
1.6 Avez-vous été informés de vos droits?    
 1.6.1. Droit de bénéficier des activités?    
 1.6.2. Droit de participer à la prise de décision?    
 1.6.3. Autres     
1.7 Comment avez-vous été informés de vos droits? Qui vous a informé?  
 
1.8 Avez-vous été autorisés de rester et de ne pas proposer 
les activités du projet?  
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1.9 Est ce qu’on vous a donné assez de temps pour 
considérer les informations fournies ? 
   
1.10 Qui avait participé au processus de prise de décision? (tout le village, leader 
de la communauté,  etc…) 
 
1.11 Connaissez-vous les termes de l’entente du projet?    
1.12 Quelle est la durée de  l’accord du projet ? 
1.13 Connaissez-vous la superficie du projet (ha)?    
1.15 Y a-t-il des règles communautaires pour la gestion des 
forêts? 
   
1.16 Si oui, êtes- vous accord avec ces lois?    
1.17 Êtes-vous satisfait avec votre niveau de participation 
dans les projets ? 
   
 
2. Questions liées à la perception des villageois sur comment la REDD+ et les 
concessions forestières  seront bénéfiques pour eux  
 Questions oui Non Ne sais 
pas  
 Offre d'emploi    
 Améliorations des moyens d'existence    
 Avantages écosystémiques directs Ex. PFNL, bois de 
feu, du fourrage 
   
 Renforcement des droits fonciers et application de la 
loi 
   
 Renforcement de la participation dans la prise de 
décision 
   
 Avantages des infrastructures Ex. routes, des écoles    
 Avantages écosystémiques indirects Ex. protection des 
sols et qualité de l'eau, protection de la biodiversité 
   
 Réduire l'exploitation forestière à grande échelle    
 Autres:    
 
3. Questions relatives à la formule de partage des bénéfices équitables, non 
discriminatoire  et transparent 
3.1 est ce que la participation au projet a  mis de limites sur vos activités familiales? 
Si oui comment? 
 
3.2 est ce qu’il y a un conflit interne dans la communauté par rapport au projet? Si oui, 
quelles sont les raisons? 
 
3.3  est ce que votre famille reçoit un avantage en participant au projet?  Si oui, quels 
sont les   bénéfices (financiers et non financiers  exp. Intrants agricoles, renforcement 
des capacités).  
 
3.4 Qu’est ce qui a été mis sur pied pour partager les bénéfices du projet dans le 
village? Depuis quand ?  
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3.5 est-vous satisfait du processus de décisions? Si non quelle sont les problèmes ou 
inconvénients du procédé de distribution? (Ex. le manque d'information et la 
participation, la livraison irrégulière des fonds, etc.)? 
 
 
3.6 Qui est impliqué dans la gestion? 
3.7  Selon vous quel peut être le meilleur mécanisme de partage des bénéfices? (exp. 
L’approche de partage des bénéfices par ménages, approche communautaire)  
 
 
3.8   A votre avis, qui devrait bénéficier des activités des projets? 
 
 
3.9 Quelles est la nature de la contribution non financière? Comment sont-ils montés 
et à quelle fin ?  
 
 
3.10  Selon vous quels sont les impacts négatifs et/ou positifs du projet  maintenant et 
dans le future? 
3.11 Quel devrait être le rôle des autorités locales administratives et traditionnelles 
dans les processus de partage des avantages?
1. L' accès actuel 
a. Quelle est la distance la plus proche de la zone de la forêt vous utilisez?  
b. toute la communauté utilise la même forêt ? (YES/NO) 
c. Qui est propriétaire de la terre que vous utilisez? Comment avez-vous obtenu 
les droits ?  Ex. le patrimoine ou éclaircir la terre. 
______________________________________________________________
____ 
d. Qui est propriétaire des arbres que vous 
utilisez?_______________________________________ 
e. Questions relatives aux droits existants 
As-tu OUI NON 
i. des droits d'accès   
ii. des droits d'accès   
iii. des droits du retrait   
le droit de prendre des arbres de la forêt pour la 
cuisson 
  
le droit de prendre des arbres de la forët pour la 
construction 
  
le droit de vendre des arbres   
iv. le droit de prendre d'autres produits de la forêt   
v. droits de gestion (décider de la gestion / l'avenir de la 
forêt) 
  
vi. droits d'exclusion (qui peuvent accéder et utiliser la 
zone de la forêt) 
  
vii. les droits de propriété ( de posséder et vendre)   
viii. Les droits à indemnisation (les droits à la justice ou de 
compensation lorsque l'État décide de supprimer l'un 
des droits ci-dessus) 
  
f. Lequel des droits ci-dessus sont les plus importants pour vous? _________________ 
f. Pensez-vous que ce projet REDD + / FLEGT pourrait vous aider à sécuriser le 
droit que vous avez mentionné ci-dessus? Comment? 
________________________________________________________________
_______ 




2. Questions concernant la documentation des droits 
Avez-vous un document clair sur les droits conférés OUI NON 
Y at-il des limites claires dans le document   
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durée des droits d'utilisation par example années   
taille de la zone   
de location de la zone   
le montant et la fréquence de la récolte autorisée   
 
3. Questions sur l'expropriation de la terre  
Y at-il eu de l'expropriation de terres en raison du PSE OUI NON 
Y at-il eu de l’expropriation de terres en raison du entreprises   
at-il affecté votre bien-être   
avez-vous été indemnisé   
 
4.  Avantages de la terre 
a. De un à cinq, comment voulez-vous valoriser ce qui suit comme des moyens 
d'obtenir la valeur de la terre 
 pas du tout pas spécialement bien assez beaucoup 
des arbres      
agriculture      
paiements pour services écosystémiques 
PSE 
     
location de terrain      
 
 5. REDD+ et FLEGT 
a. Quel genre de projets que vous pensez serait bon d'avoir qui permettra de réduire 
la déforestation et la dégradation des forêts ( perte de forêt ) ? 
____________________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
b.  Quels sont les facteurs assurant que vous serez avec le projet à l'avenir ? par 
exemple les soins de santé, l'éducation , l'eau potable , des produits agricoles tels 
que les semences 
____________________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
c. comment les projets peuvent contribuer à les droits d’acces, d’usage et de propriete 





 Y at-il eu des améliorations avec la projets? OUI NON 
à l'état de forêt   
dans les moyens de subsistance de la population locale (Ex. le développement 
communautaire . écoles , centres de santé ) 
  
dans le partage de l'information   
dans le renforcement des capacités   
dans les droits d’accés   
dans les droits d’usage   
droits de propriété   
dans une autre ? Où? _____________________________________________ 
7.  Pensez-vous que les projets peuvent réduire la déforestation? 
ENQUETE SUR LES VALEURS DES FORETS COMMUNAUTAIRES ET LA CONFORMITE 
A LA LOI FORESTIERE AU CAMEROUN.  
Section 2. Valeurs et Conformité à la Loi 
1. Cette série de questions concerne votre opinion personnelle à propos du code forestier. Je vais lire 
quelques affirmations et vous me direz si vous êtes d’accord avec ces affirmations. Vous avez quatre 
options : Désaccord total (SD), désaccord (D), Accord (A), Accord total (SA). 
 
a) Vous violerez le code forestier :  
  SD D A SA 
13.  Si les agents forestiers accident et bénéficient des ressources 
forestières et vous n’êtes pas autorisé (justice) 
1 2 3 4 
14.  Si briser les règles améliorera votre vie communautaire (sens de la 
communauté) 
1 2 3 4 
15.  Si briser les règles améliorera votre situation financière 
(économique) 
1 2 3 4 
16.  Si briser les règles est l’unique option pour assurer votre survie  
(survie) 
1 2 3 4 
17.  Si les concessionnaires forestiers coupent plus d’arbres qu’ils ne 
sont supposés et vous vous n’êtes pas autorises (justice) 
1 2 3 4 
18.  Si les membres de votre communauté accèdent à la foret  et en 
bénéficient et vous non (justice). 
1 2 3 4 
19.  Si obéir aux règles est difficile et couteux (économique) 1 2 3 4 
20.  Si la loi va contre ce que vos ancêtres vous ont enseigne  (tradition) 1 2 3 4 
21.  Si la loi enfreint vos pratiques religieuses  (religion) 1 2 3 4 
22.  Si vous êtes sure que personne ne saura (rationalité) 1 2 3 4 
23 Parce que vous pensez que les règles sont injustes et bénéficient juste 
aux riches et aux puissants (justice) 
1 2 3 4 
 Autres  (A spécifier): 1 2 3 4 
b) Vous obéirez au code forestier  si: 
 
  SD D A SA 
24.  Si vous recevez des compensations/récompense pour avoir protégé la 
foret (économique/rationnelle) 
1 2 3 4 
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25.  Si la foret  que vous protégez est votre propriété privée (vous 
appartient) (économique/rationnelle) 
1 2 3 4 
26.  Si vous voyez les offenseurs sanctionnés (rationalité, crainte de la loi) 1 2 3 4 
27.  Si c’est une décision collective par la communauté et non une 
obligation “des autorités” (participation, gouvernance) 
1 2 3 4 
28.  Parce que la foret a le droit d’exister pour son propre bien même sans 
bénéficier a la population (valeur intrinsèque) 
1 2 3 4 
29.  Si les règles protègent les sites naturels sacres et les bosquets 
(spiritualité) 
1 2 3 4 
30.  Si les anciens (personnes âgées dans votre famille/communauté) vous 
ont encouragé à obéir au code forestier (tradition)  
1 2 3 4 
31.  Si les leaders religieux ont prêché que violer les lois et les règles est 
un péché et une offense à Dieu (religion) 
1 2 3 4 
32.  Afin de préserver les forets pour vos enfants et les enfants de vos 
enfants (valeur future de la foret). 
1 2 3 4 
33.  Parce que la violation du code forestier pourrait laisser sans ressources 
des populations dans votre communauté 
 (éthique, sens de la communauté) 
1 2 3 4 
34.  Parce que l’environnement sera plus sain et beau (esthétique) 1 2 3 4 
35.  Parce que la désobéissance pourrait causer la dégradation de la foret 
et affecter l’air, l’eau et le sol (environnement). 
1 2 3 4 
36.  Parce que la désobéissance pourrait laisser les animaux (chèvres, 
moutons et faune en général) sans leur habitat et le fourrage  
(environnement). 
1 2 3 4 
 Autres (a spécifier):… 1 2 3 4 
 
2. Ces questions concernent votre opinion à propos des règles forestières spécifiques et s’ils 
devraient être obéis, désobéis, changes, etc. Si la question de quelque manière vous 
embarrasse, vous pouvez refuser de répondre. 
 









40. Les populations coupent les arbres sans permission  4 3 2 1 5 
Quelque peu vrai: pourquoi (dans quelles situations)?  
 
Si non/pas vraiment: pourquoi pas? 
 
41. Les populations cultivent dans les réserves forestières 4 3 2 1 5 
Quelque peu vrai: pourquoi (dans quelles situations)?  
 
Si non/pas vraiment: pourquoi pas? 
 
42. La population ne suit pas les règles de gestion des 
feux, ce qui pourrait causer des feux de brousse. 
 
4 3 2 1 5 
Si oui / quelque peu vrai: pourquoi (dans quelles situations)? 
 
Si non/pas vraiment: pourquoi pas? 
 











43.  Coupent les arbres sans permission 3 2 1 4 
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Si “Comprends” /”En un certain sens”: Pourquoi? 
 
Si  “Ne comprends pas”: Pourquoi pas? 
 
44. Utilisent les réserves forestières pour le champ 3 2 1 4 
Si “Comprends” /”En un certain sens”: Pourquoi? 
 
Si  “Ne comprends pas”: Pourquoi pas? 
 
45. Ne suivent pas les règles de gestion des feux qui pourraient causer 
des feux de brousse  
3 2 1 4 
Si “Comprends” /”En un certain sens”: Pourquoi? 
 
Si  “Ne comprends pas”: Pourquoi pas? 
 
Effectuerez-vous vous même les actions 
suivantes: 
Oui Seulement en cas de 
situation difficile 
Non Autre 
40. Couper les arbres sans permission 3 2 1  
Si oui/en situation difficile: Quand.  
Sinon: Pourquoi? 
 
41. Cultiver dans les réserves forestières? 3 2 1  
Si oui/en situation difficile: Quand.  
Sinon: Pourquoi? 
 
42. Ne pas suivre les règles de gestion des feux, ce 
qui pourrait causer des feux de brousse. 
3 2 1  




Section 3. Raisons pour la conformité (Obligation et Légitimité) 
 Dissuasion:  
 
3. Cette série de questions concernent les agents forestiers dans les collectivités et le travail qu’ils y 
effectuent. Supposons que vous avez commis quelques fraudes forestières. Quelle est la probabilité 





Assez probable Tres 
probable  
46. Dans le cas où vous coupez des 
arbres sans permission  
1 2 3 4 
47. Dans le cas où vous cultivez 
dans les réserves forestières. 
1 2 3 4 
48. Dans le cas ou vos actions ont 
causé un feu de brousse  
1 2 3 4 
4. Supposons que vous avez été attrapé commettant certains délits forestiers. Quelles sont les trois 
sanctions les plus communes auxquelles vous vous attendez de la part des agents forestiers ou des 
CFCs, pour les délits suivants ? :  
 
49. Couper les arbres sans permission  50. Cultiver dans les réserves forestières 
- Aucune sanction (Comme on peut facilement les 
soudoyer)...(1) 
- Amende financière …………………… (2) 
- Arrêt et poursuite devant une cour de justice (3) 
-  Saisir les équipements et les produits …(4) 
- Aucune sanction (Comme on peut facilement les 
soudoyer)...(1) 
- Amende financière …………………… (2) 
- Arrêt et poursuite devant une cour de justice (3) 
-  Saisir les équipements et les produits …(4) 
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- Paiement en nature (ex. chèvre, mouton, sac de maïs) 
...(5) 






- Paiement en nature (ex. chèvre, mouton, sac de 
maïs) ...(5) 






51. Votre action a causé le déclenchement d’un feu de brousse  
- Aucune sanction (Comme on peut facilement les 
soudoyer)...(1) 
- Amende financiere …………………… (2) 
- Arrêt et poursuite devant une cour de justice (3) 
-  Saisir les équipements et les produits …(4) 
 
- Paiement en nature (ex. chèvre, mouton, sac de 
mais) ...(5) 







5. Quels sont les trois sanctions (punitions) que vous craignez le plus (que s’ils arrivent vous 
seront le plus préjudiciable)  ? 
 
- Arrêt et convocation a la police..................................................................1 
- Amende financiere.......................................................................................................... 2 
- Saisie de l’équipement et des produits par les agents forestiers.....................3 
- Paiement en nature (ex. chèvre, mouton, sac de mais).............................................4 
- Désapprobation des membres de la communauté  ...................................5 
- Etre convoqué chez le chef et les notables pour votre action ....................6 
- Affronter la honte de vos voisins pour avoir commis pareil offense...........7 
- Destruction de vos propriétés (cultures, champ)..................................................8 
- Autres: ................ 
 
Section 4. Légitimité 
6. Cette série de questions concerne votre satisfaction du comportement et du travail des agents 
forestiers dans votre localité. 
52. Etes-vous satisfait du travail des agents 
forestiers en general? 
Pas du tout satisfait  Pas satisfait Satisfait  Tres satisfait 
 1 2 3 4 
Pourquoi? 
 
53. Pensez-vous que les agents forestiers 
méritent le respect de la communauté? 
Ne méritent 
aucun respect  
Méritent un certain 
respect 
Méritent un grand 
respect 
 1 2 3 
Pourquoi? 
 
54. Pensez-vous que les agents forestiers prennent des decisions 






 4 3 2 1 
Pourquoi? 
 
55. Pensez-vous que vous et d’autres personnes comme vous sont traités: de la même 
manière, mieux or plus mal que d’autres, par les agents forestiers? 






 2 3 1 





Annex 2: Questionnaire for the officials 
 
present state of FLEGT and REDD+ 
 













 What is the current progress of revisioning the rights and does REDD+ 



















___________What do you think are the main challenges of FLEGT and REDD+ 





 What is the way to ensure full and effect engagement and participation of 
national stakeholders on tenure and access rights. 












TENURE AND OWNERSHIP 
 
 to achieve the targets of REDD+ /FLEGT, what rights you think would be 






COOPERATION BETWEEN FLEGT AND REDD+ 
 
 What is your opinion about the current level of cooperation  between REDD+ 














   10. What have been the major improvements after  FLEGT and REDD+? Has 
FLEGT/REDD+ 
contributed to better condition of forests, livelihoods of locals, transparency etc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
